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First Committee
14th Meeting
Tuesday, 7 November 1995, 10 a.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Erdenechuluun . . . . . (Mongolia)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

Agenda items 57 to 81 (*continued*)

Consideration of draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Mexico to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3.

Mr. de Icaza (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The testing of nuclear weapons must end, and must end immediately. This is demanded by international public opinion, which has mobilized this year on an unprecedented scale to criticize the series of tests that are being carried out. This international public opinion has been evident not only in the statements of government spokesmen the world over and in regional bodies and meetings, including some at the level of Heads of State or Government, but also in demonstrations on the part of civil society in the streets and even at sea.

The international community knows that the time is ripe for easing tension in international relations in order to put an end once and for all to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their aspects, to reverse the nuclear-arms race, and to put an end to the threat posed by nuclear explosions to the health of humanity and the planet's environment.

Real non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not limited to the horizontal spread: rather it includes the stockpiling and qualitative improvement and perfection of these weapons.

At the Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear-weapon States made a commitment to act with the utmost restraint in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Although the broadest interpretation of the meaning of "restraint" is clearly not compatible with that commitment, the carrying out of a series of tests or of tests aimed at perfecting nuclear weapons is in contradiction with the aim of non-proliferation.

Although the commitment, in its strict legal sense, has no binding force, it was approved along with the decision for an indefinite extension of the NPT and is irreversible, as indeed are all the decisions taken at that occasion. Included in those decisions is the approval of machinery strengthened by periodic reviews and verifications of the commitments and obligations undertaken by all States parties to the Treaty.

For my country, there is a clear link between the consolidation of an effective and genuine non-proliferation regime and progress towards the earliest possible elimination of weapons of mass destruction. On 5 September, the Government of Mexico stated, on the occasion of a nuclear test, that it is obvious that, if any of the periodic reviews of the non-proliferation Treaty should conclude that Powers are not complying with their commitments, we always have the option of taking drastic measures, including a review of our position on the non-proliferation Treaty on the basis of article X of that international instrument.

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Among the Principles and Objectives agreed upon at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, what stands out is the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible and by 1996 at the latest. As I had occasion to state when I had the honour to preside over the Conference on Disarmament this year, it is not easy — in fact, it is very difficult — to negotiate disarmament matters with the music of nuclear explosions in the background. If tests do not cease, we will lack the favourable atmosphere necessary to conclude these important negotiations within the proposed time-frame.

We have been told that the current tests are harmless and represent no danger to the health of people and the environment. In this regard, I would venture to quote from my own statement in the general debate in this Committee:

> "There are no proven truths, but there are obvious absurdities ... Our planet is a limited entity, and in the past 50 years 2,044 nuclear tests have been carried out — an average of approximately one every nine days. It is clearly absurd to say that this incessant bombardment, this constant shaking up of the innards of our planet, has had and will have no effect on the environment or on this Earth, which belongs to all of us and to our descendants." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, First Committee, 3rd meeting, p. 9)*

We believe that the profound concern regarding the possible negative effects of underground nuclear tests is fully justified. The Organization of American States, for example, stated on 13 September that nuclear tests being carried out in the South Pacific pose a potential risk to the health and security of surrounding States and their living resources and environment, and do not take into account the precautionary principle contained in the Rio Declaration on environment and development and in other regional agreements.

These are some of the reasons that inspired my delegation to support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3, in which the General Assembly would reaffirm that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide a favourable climate for the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Assembly, considering that nuclear testing was not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, deeply concerned about the potential negative effects of underground nuclear testing and sharing the alarm expressed internationally, regionally and nationally, would strongly deplore all current nuclear testing and urge the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing.

My delegation hopes that this draft resolution will be adopted by a broad majority representing the international community as a whole, because nuclear testing must come to an end and must do so immediately.

The Chairman: I call on the Secretary of the Committee, who will provide us with some information regarding our work.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to provide some updated information concerning the current status of draft resolutions.

As of 6 p.m. yesterday, we had received a total of 50 drafts, two of which are draft decisions and the rest draft resolutions. I should point out that all the draft decisions and resolutions up to the one in A/C.1/50/L.33 have been issued and are available as of this morning. It is my hope that the balance will be available by tomorrow.

I should also refer to one other issue. The letter I received by fax from you, Sir, in your capacity as Chairman of the First Committee, addressed to me in my capacity as Secretary of the First Committee, reads as follows, though I must emphasize that of course this letter was received, so to speak, before the 6 p.m. deadline.

"Dear Mr. Kheradi,

> "As you may recall, agenda item 79, entitled 'Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee', has been discussed by the Bureau. Subsequently, I made an oral report to the First Committee, where the membership agreed to the Bureau's proposal to postpone the discussion of this item to a later session. It has also been agreed that the Bureau, with the assistance of the Secretariat, will table the draft of a decision to the First Committee at an appropriate time. I therefore kindly ask you, Mr. Secretary, to assist me in setting up a meeting of the Bureau for the purpose of discussing the draft decision to be proposed to the Committee."

I should point out in that connection that we in the Secretariat actually do have a brief draft of a decision and we will bring it to the attention of the Chairman and the Bureau for approval and subsequent recommendation to the First Committee.

May I also inform the Committee that the following countries have become sponsors of the following draft resolutions:

A/C.1/50/L.1/Rev.1: Chile, Mongolia, Nigeria, Portugal and Slovakia;

A/C.1/50/L.3: Botswana, Maldives, Panama, Paraguay, Thailand and Ukraine;

A/C.1/50/L.5: Cuba;

A/C.1/50/L.7: Australia, Belarus, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Germany, Iceland, Mali, Norway, Peru, Sweden and Romania;

A/C.1/50/L.8: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States;

A/C.1/50/L.9: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Republic of Moldova, Pakistan and Russian Federation;

A/C.1/50/L.11: Argentina and Mongolia;

A/C.1/50/L.14: Chile and Peru;

A/C.1/50/L.24: Japan; and

A/C.1/50/L.15: Argentina.

Mr. Samana (Papua New Guinea): I wish to speak on behalf of my country, Papua New Guinea, which currently holds the Chair of the South Pacific Forum, and on behalf of the South Pacific Forum countries in support of the draft resolution on nuclear testing contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3.

Before I do so, may I congratulate you, Sir, and the other members of the Bureau on your elections to your posts in this important Committee. Papua New Guinea assures you of its fullest support and cooperation in the discharge of your important duties.

May I also take this opportunity, on behalf of the South Pacific Forum countries, to express our deepest sympathy to the family of the late Prime Minister Rabin and the people of Israel for the most horrific act of terrorism that has taken the life of a leader who championed the cause of peace for his people, the Palestinians and the world. It is our hope that the people of Israel will stand firm and continue to support the great cause of peace that the late Prime Minister stood for and fought for and which sadly led to his death.

The South Pacific Forum countries have consistently argued that nuclear testing in any part of the world is a step backward. Such actions runs contrary to the objectives and the spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and are a complete violation of trust between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Continuous nuclear- weapon testing undermines the delicate balance and confidence established by States parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

We strongly believe from our experience that nuclear testing is a direct threat to our environment and to the survival of our people. We do not accept the argument that nuclear testing is scientifically safe. There is no such thing as a safe nuclear test. Dealing with weapons of mass destruction is a very dangerous and highly risky experiment, one in which the slightest accident could be and can be fatal to human life and is potentially dangerous to the environment and the health of the people now and in the future.

There is absolutely no justification for undertaking such a disgraceful and deplorable activity. It only creates anxieties and aggravates good-neighbourly relations. Those who adhere to the archaic principles of nuclear deterrence are living in the past and working against the spirit of international cooperation.

We thank those who have come forward as sponsors of the draft resolution before us and we call upon the fraternal States of Latin America and the Caribbean that are parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco; our fraternal States from the continent of Africa that are also working towards a nuclear-free zone in Africa; friendly States of the Middle East and Asia; and like-minded countries of the European Union, including the Eastern European countries, to stand together in solidarity and vote for the draft resolution opposing nuclear testing.

Like many of the countries members of the Forum, we would have favoured a much stronger text, one drafted in more condemnatory terms. However, in the interest of consensus, we are prepared to live with the draft resolution before us.

In our opinion, a vote in support of the draft resolution is a vote against intolerance. It is a vote against

arrogance and insensitivity; a vote against myopic parochialism; a vote against those who dare to threaten international peace and security; a vote against those whose actions threaten our national, regional and global environment and the ecosystem; and a vote against the abuse of political power against humanity. In sum, a vote for the draft resolution is a vote against irrationality.

A positive vote for the draft resolution is a vote for peace and a vote for a future based on confidence. A positive vote is a vote for tolerance; a vote for the protection of our environment; and a vote for humanity.

We call on those of moral courage and good conscience to vote in support of the draft resolution in the name of international solidarity and universalism and to pave the way for a new moral order; to promote peace and not havoc; to promote human development, not human destruction; and to promote good will and not ill will. In this context, we consider that a vote in favour of the draft resolution will pave the way forward, establishing regional nuclear-free zones and thus enhance greater international confidence, which will provide sound conditions for peace and development.

On behalf of the countries members of the Forum, we stand firm in support of the draft resolution and call upon the representatives of the States Members of the United Nations for their valuable support, which would send a clear message to the international community that we cannot accept the actions of those who dare to threaten international peace and the basic sustenance of human life.

Mrs. Kurokochi (Japan): I should like to make some comments on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, which has just been introduced by the representative of Mexico and of which Japan is a co-sponsor.

The nuclear testing currently being conducted by two nuclear-weapon States is extremely disturbing to international efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Therefore, it is of vital importance for the international community to show its strong determination to pursue the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing. In the light of this fact, it is crucial that the General Assembly adopt this draft resolution with the widest possible support by Member States.

Let me explain briefly our thoughts on some of the elements of the draft resolution. First, the purpose of the draft resolution is not to condemn any particular country. The aim of this draft resolution is to express our opposition to nuclear testing. Accordingly, the draft resolution does not mention any country by name. It focuses on the current nuclear testing.

Secondly, some countries have expressed their concern that this draft resolution might have a negative effect on the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On the contrary, we believe that showing strong opposition to nuclear testing will enable us to progress in those negotiations with a view to the earliest possible conclusion with good results. The draft resolution is a clear expression of the international community's position against nuclear testing. With this draft resolution, we expect that nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States will further their efforts towards the successful completion of the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Thirdly, it has been argued by some countries that the current nuclear testing is not inconsistent with the "utmost restraint" mentioned in the Principles and Objectives decided at the Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is a fact, however, that, according to those Principles and Objectives, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint. We consider this to be a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. We also believe that the current nuclear testing is not a demonstration of "utmost restraint", but that it actually shows less restraint after the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

Having said that, I would like to make it clear that the phrase "not consistent with" in this draft resolution is not meant to suggest that the countries in question are violating international law. Furthermore, the words "nuclear testing" refer of course to nothing but the current underground nuclear testing begun following the NPT Review Conference.

Nuclear testing is a matter of global concern. We must demonstrate our international solidarity against nuclear testing. The adoption of this draft resolution with widespread support would demonstrate our determination to abolish nuclear testing, thus giving a positive impetus to the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Japan strongly appeals to all Member States to support this draft resolution.

Mr. Starr (Australia): Australia would much have preferred to be speaking today in support of the positive trends evident in today's world, such as the unprecedented international commitment to achieving a nuclear-weapon-

free world. Instead, we find ourselves speaking on an issue which belongs firmly in yesterday's world — the world of the cold war and the nuclear arms race. That issue is nuclear testing.

The Australian Government's position on nuclear testing is unequivocal: we strongly deplore and condemn it. Nuclear testing has no place in the current era. It must end and it must end now.

These are the central points of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/50/L.3, which was introduced this morning and enjoys a wide range of sponsors, including Australia. Many things could be said about nuclear testing, but we and the other sponsors of this draft resolution have chosen to keep its message simple and direct. As the text says, we "strongly deplore" nuclear testing and we urge its "immediate cessation".

A strong and clear call for the immediate cessation of nuclear testing is of critical importance and we look to see the widest support for this call among Members of the United Nations. Nuclear testing flies in the face of international opinion, as demonstrated by the outcry from around the globe, including in France, in response to the French Government's decision to resume testing in the South Pacific.

Nuclear testing flies in the face of the post-cold-war disarmament agenda. This agenda includes historic bilateral arms-reduction treaties between the major nuclear-weapon States and a multilateral treaty banning all nuclear testing, the comprehensive test-ban treaty soon to be concluded in Geneva. Nuclear testing also raises unacceptable concerns about the potential effects on the environment, particularly in the fragile marine environment of the South Pacific coral atolls where France conducts its tests. We do not have information to lay those concerns to rest.

Nuclear testing flies in the face of the political commitments made by States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at the NPT Review and Extension Conference six months ago. Those commitments, contained in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which accompanied the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, included a political commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to exercise utmost restraint pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. There has been much debate about the words "utmost restraint", but let us be clear. The Chinese Government tested almost before the ink was dry on the NPT extension decision. And, shortly thereafter, France announced an intensive programme of eight tests at the rate of about one a month. Such actions cannot by any definition be considered restrained.

Australia welcomes the continuing commitment of the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom to their own unilateral nuclear-testing moratoriums. We reject utterly the decisions of France and China to resume or continue testing.

The NPT Conference reaffirmed the objective we all share of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The cessation of nuclear testing can only assist our efforts towards that objective: its continuation can only hinder them. These are the reasons why we are joining others in calling for the immediate cessation of testing. The word "immediate" signifies a unique point in time. That time, we believe, is now.

Mr. Abdul Momin (Brunei Darussalam): My delegation and I would like to extend our many congratulations to you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee.

When the Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was concluded here in New York six months ago, much trust was placed in the early conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, about which I wish to speak briefly.

For Brunei Darussalam, the comprehensive test-ban treaty is of the highest priority in terms of halting the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. Brunei Darussalam also believes that that treaty would be the most effective way to eliminate existing nuclear weapons and prevent anyone from acquiring new ones. We also see no need for the tests to be carried out under the pretext of the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons. Hence, the recent nuclear testing deeply concerns us. It is not consistent with undertakings made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

We therefore call for the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing and feel that this will be a strong contribution to our overall aims of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament and will provide a favourable climate for the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The treaty should be in force for all time without any exception, and the zero yield of the scope of the treaty, which was endorsed

unequivocally by the three nuclear-weapon Powers and many other States, is tantamount to a truly comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

In this regard, Brunei Darussalam welcomes the declaration made by the nuclear States and their commitment to sign the treaty before September 1996, and this will be followed by its early entry into force. My delegation is confident that the treaty will be concluded as scheduled in the same spirit as that which inspired the signing of other treaties of the same nature, especially those between the United States and the former Soviet Union.

The indefinite extension of the NPT sent a clear message. Besides the fact that it continues to be the most universal and fundamental instrument for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, its extension demonstrated the international community's common desire to reject all weapons of mass destruction. Despite some positive developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, my delegation would like to reiterate its belief that more could have been done over the past year.

We share the concern of many others about the possibility of more countries possessing these weapons of mass destruction. We have also still to witness any dramatic reduction in the quality of arms in terms of their ability to destroy. This means that, given the modernization of weapons and their capability and accuracy, the threat of weapons of mass destruction has not yet been adequately lessened.

The extension of the NPT is not an end in itself: it must be followed by further steps towards complete disarmament, adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. In regional terms, Brunei Darussalam remains fully committed in its efforts to ensure a peaceful and secure environment. We look forward to the completion of the negotiations on the treaty on a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The major Powers should play a leading role in promoting a peaceful and secure environment. In this regard, Brunei Darussalam welcomes the United States statement of 11 August, particularly the part regarding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Brunei Darussalam sees this as a manifestation of the collective stance that the proliferation of nuclear weapons needs to be totally and immediately curbed.

As a reflection of our commitment to this high ideal, Brunei Darussalam has consistently supported efforts towards the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I should like to give to the Committee Brunei Darussalam's assurance of its full cooperation in the realization of the Committee's objectives. In this regard, my delegation is pleased to join in sponsoring the draft resolution on this subject now before us.

Mr. Keating (New Zealand): I join previous speakers in supporting the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3, of which New Zealand is also a sponsor.

This session of the First Committee is taking place against the background of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a conference at which the norms of nuclear non-proliferation were reinforced and cemented in place by the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. That was, New Zealand believes, a wise move. Decisions taken at that Conference have laid the foundations for the structure of a new international security regime that will take us into the twenty-first century.

All parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), nuclear and non-nuclear, reiterated that the ultimate goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. All committed themselves to the first practical step towards this: the completion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than next year.

But only two days after the Conference concluded, China exploded a nuclear device and, subsequently, France resumed testing in the South Pacific. Three tests have been carried out so far; more are planned. As the draft resolution before us makes clear, individuals, countries and whole regions have expressed their real alarm at this new spate of nuclear testing.

In our region — because that is where tests are actually taking place — leaders have expressed more than alarm: South Pacific leaders have expressed extreme outrage. We have condemned nuclear testing, and called for it to be stopped immediately.

The reason for this alarm, this outrage throughout the world, can be understood in the light of the fact that these same countries that are continuing to test nuclear weapons resumed their testing programmes in disregard of commitments entered into at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Let us recall that, at that Conference, they agreed to exercise "utmost restraint". We

hear arguments addressed against draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 to the effect that there was never any legal obligation in respect of nuclear testing entered into at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. We believe that that argument is disingenuous and mischievous: let us be quite clear — the draft resolution is not drafted on the basis of an argument by anyone that legal obligations were undertaken at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. They were not. What was agreed at that Conference were solemn political undertakings, and it is those solemn political obligations that have been flagrantly violated and now give rise to this storm of political reaction.

It is simply not tenable to argue that a commitment to exercise utmost restraint could be compatible with what China and France have been doing. The word "restraint" on its own means holding back from something one would otherwise do, but when that word is qualified by the additional word "utmost", it can be interpreted in good faith only as an undertaking that no further nuclear-test explosions will take place pending the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Against that background, this draft resolution demonstrates that it is not only the community of non-governmental organizations, not only the general public of the world, that is outraged, but that this behaviour is deplored in the strongest possible terms by Governments as well.

This message has to get through: nuclear-test explosions are deplorable, and must cease immediately. New Zealand urges all other members of this Committee to join us in delivering this message by voting in favour of the draft resolution when it is put to the vote.

Mr. Izquierdo (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Ecuador wishes to make a brief statement in support of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, which was submitted this morning by the representative of Mexico.

With this in view, the delegation of Ecuador wishes to restate its position: it repudiates nuclear tests inasmuch as they are steps towards vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the destabilization of international security and the irreversible destruction of the environment.

At the same time, we should like to remind members that, in the Quito Declaration of 5 September 1995, the Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group referred explicitly to the subject of nuclear tests in the following terms:

> "As the elected leaders of countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, we express our deep concern over and condemnation of the resumption of nuclear tests by the People's Republic of China and the decision of the Government of France to resume testing in the Pacific, the geographic region in which most member countries of the Rio Group are situated. Considering that such actions adversely affect the climate for the pursuit of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, we urgently appeal to the Governments of all States which possess this type of weapons to observe unilateral or agreed moratoria on all nuclear testing in order to speed up the negotiations on an effectively verifiable multilateral treat banning all nuclear tests." (*A/50/425, annex, para. 20*)

In the light of this Declaration, my delegation calls for the greatest possible support for the draft resolution.

Mr. Felicio (Brazil): The Government of Brazil has already expressed regret at, and condemned, the resumption of nuclear testing by some nuclear-weapon States. Brazil has joined in the declarations of a similar nature made in other forums, such as the Rio Group and the Organization of American States. Together with the States parties to the Treaty of Tlateloco we have joined the States parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga in condemning the nuclear tests. On the other hand, my Government has expressed its appreciation to those countries which continue to observe the nuclear-testing moratoriums they have declared. It is our expectation that countries supporting disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will advocate the immediate cessation of nuclear tests. Nuclear-test explosions should stop immediately. For this reason Brazil is joining in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3.

Insisting on carrying out nuclear tests goes against the general trend towards nuclear disarmament, which is our legitimate aspiration. Testing may also interfere with the Geneva negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which the international community has pledged to achieve next year. It is appropriate that the General Assembly take the action proposed in the draft resolution before us. We are certain that this draft resolution reflects the wish of the international community. We expect that a very large number of delegations will vote in favour of this resolution.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Mongolia, who will introduce the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/50/L.16 and A/C.1/50/L.31.

Mr. Yumjar (Mongolia): Mongolia has joined in sponsoring the draft resolution on "nuclear testing" contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3, which was introduced this morning by the representative of Mexico on behalf of its sponsors. Mongolia has done so because it firmly believes in the urgent need for the complete cessation of all nuclear testing and for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early date.

We are gratified to note that the political will now exists to conclude such a treaty no later than 1996. However, it is with deep regret that the two nuclear-weapon Powers have chosen to disregard the will of the international community and their own commitment undertaken during the Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to "exercise utmost restraint". The Heads of State or Government of the States members of the Non-Aligned Movement, at their latest Conference in Colombia, firmly rejected all kinds of nuclear testing and strongly deplored the resumption and continuation of nuclear testing. They called upon all the nuclear-weapon States to act in a manner consistent with the negotiations and objectives of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Mongolia fully subscribes to the strong appeal made in the draft resolution for the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing. Our resolve for an urgent ban on all nuclear testing is strengthened further by the fact that those tests are being conducted in the vicinity of the Mongolian borders. My Government expresses its fervent hope that the two nuclear-weapon States will heed the demand of the international community and immediately stop the nuclear-weapon tests. We call upon all States to give their active support to the draft resolution.

I now have the pleasure of introducing, on behalf of the sponsors, draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.16, entitled "Disarmament Week". The draft resolution is sponsored by the delegations of Afghanistan, China, Costa Rica, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Samoa, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Mongolia.

Disarmament Week, observed annually since 1978, has contributed substantially to increasing general public awareness of and support for the disarmament process and the role of the United Nations in this field. The report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/50/291 and the special meeting of the First Committee as well as other events traditionally held in observance of Disarmament Week have once again proven that the international community continues to rely on Disarmament Week as an appropriate occasion for further promoting national and international activities to educate and inform the public about major disarmament issues and developments.

The text of the draft resolution before us reproduces, with some slight changes, the text of General Assembly resolution 47/54 C, adopted at the forty-seventh session without a vote.

In the preambular part of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.16 the General Assembly would note the fundamental change that has been brought about by the end of the cold war and of bipolar confrontation, welcome the important recent achievements in disarmament, stress the increasing role and prestige of the United Nations, and emphasize anew the need for and the importance of world public opinion in support of disarmament efforts. It would recall the recommendations concerning Disarmament Week taken by the General Assembly at its first, second and third special sessions devoted to disarmament; and would recognize the significance of the annual observance of Disarmament Week.

In the operative part of the draft resolution the General Assembly would take note of the report of the Secretary-General (A/50/291); commend all States and organizations for their support and participation in Disarmament Week; invite States to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week while carrying out appropriate measures at the local level. It would invite Governments and international and national non-governmental organizations to continue to take part in Disarmament Week and would invite the Secretary-General to continue to use the United Nations informational organs to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems and the objectives of Disarmament Week. It would decide to include in the provisional agenda of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly the item entitled "Disarmament Week".

I express the hope of sponsors that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.16 will be adopted by the First Committee without a vote.

I should like now to introduce the draft resolution on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (A/C.1/50/L.31). I am doing so on behalf of the following countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Viet Nam and Mongolia.

The sponsors of the draft resolution believe that the Kathmandu Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament is doing important work in establishing a habit of dialogue in this highly diverse and complex region of the world. The sponsors therefore reaffirm their strong support for the continued operation and further strengthening of the Regional Centre as an essential promoter of the "Kathmandu process" — the more so at a time of increasing recognition of the need for regional approaches in addressing confidence-building, disarmament and other security-related issues in that part of the world.

In this connection, the sponsors appeal to Member States — particularly those within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the programme of activities of the Regional Centre. Support for the Regional Centres in Asia and the Pacific, in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean is vitally important to further sustaining and intensifying their commendable activities.

The sponsors hope that the draft resolution will be supported by all Member States. It is in this light that my delegation has decided to be a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24 on the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mr. Bune (Fiji): Fiji is one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 because of our total rejection of nuclear testing in all environments and in all forms. We condemn the recent nuclear testing by France in the South Pacific, as well as nuclear testing by China.

But our main focus and opposition relate to France, which has been conducting tests in our region — our home. With its third, and latest, test, France has shown its utter and complete contempt for the concern and opposition among significant sections of the international community and for the outrage of the people of the region.

Fiji opposes such tests. We are gravely concerned about their effects on our health and on the region's environment. The current testing is poisoning the mood at the current session of the Conference on Disarmament, creating an impossible atmosphere. In addition, it works against all our efforts towards global non-proliferation. It also sours regional relations with France. The resumption of nuclear testing in the Pacific has undermined the positive role previously played by that country.

France has defied the will of the people of the South Pacific — indeed, of the world — by continuing its nuclear testing. The Government of France has shown yet again its callous disregard for the concern of its neighbours and its blatant disregard even for the views of the French people. France has ignored the rational and urgent pleas of those most affected by its horrendous continuation of nuclear tests in the South Pacific.

Fiji is committed to nuclear disarmament and a nuclear-free world, which is why we supported the decision to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Fiji remains concerned that the French Government appears to be oblivious to the environmental and health risks posed by its continued testing. It urges France to address these concerns immediately and to provide the international community with access to all relevant scientific data and to the testing sites themselves to make possible an independent and comprehensive assessment of the effects of testing. If the tests are safe — as the French Government claims — what is the need for this cloak of secrecy, which deprives the scientific community of objective data to assess the ramifications?

We have noted with interest the recent announcement by France, the United States and the United Kingdom of their intention to become signatories to the Protocols to the Treaty on the South Pacific nuclear-free zone. If France has certain intentions, we call upon it to end its nuclear testing in the South Pacific immediately. We also urge the immediate closure of facilities associated with such testing, except those required for future environmental monitoring.

Mururoa was the subject of three independent scientific missions during the 1980s. The people conducting these studies were not given complete freedom to take samples, and the information available to them was limited. The missions found, however, that by the mid-1980s there had been some visible damage to Mururoa. The tests, by

their very nature, had caused localized fracturing of the rock around their sites.

Fiji and the South Pacific will hold France fully responsible for any adverse impact on the environment and people of the South Pacific as a result of its nuclear testing. We shall continue to add our protest to those of all Pacific peoples condemning nuclear testing in the region. We shall continue to insist that our ocean environment should not be a dumping-ground for others to pollute, as is happening at present.

Fiji is one of the sponsors of the draft resolution before the Committee because we are convinced that so long as there are nuclear weapons and nuclear testing, the horrors of a nuclear holocaust, which for too protracted a period have cast a long shadow over mankind, will remain. The text of the draft resolution is measured and rational. It expresses national, regional and international alarm about the recent nuclear tests.

Other representatives have canvassed the import of the text in greater detail. Suffice it for me, at this point, to say that the draft resolution strongly deplores all current nuclear tests. Its sponsors want testing to be stopped now. In its preambular paragraphs it places in context the basis of our deep concern about the current tests. The text is balanced and fair. It does not resort to name-calling, but it is an unequivocal political statement to France, as well as to China and others who might toy with the idea of testing a nuclear device, that the international community, of which we are a part, condemns and rejects such actions and that it will not be afraid to continue to do so.

France has been a very good friend of Fiji, but the future of the South Pacific and that of Fiji are a matter of grave concern to the countries of the South Pacific. We consider our future — the future of our people and of our livelihood — to be seriously threatened by the resumption and continuation of nuclear testing in the region.

On behalf of the Government and people of Fiji — indeed, on behalf of the South Pacific region — I am making a special appeal to all those countries that want peace in our world, to all those countries which, by treaty or otherwise, have opposed nuclear testing. I recall specifically the support of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean for the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as the General Assembly resolutions that resulted in the cessation of French nuclear testing in Africa.

I urge all delegations to support the draft resolution before the Committee. It reflects Fiji's deep dismay over an unfriendly act. Fiji urges all States — big and small, developing and developed — to support the draft resolution. A vote in favour will be a vote for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A vote in favour will be a vote for our children's security and a vote for peace. I ask representatives to promote this noble cause by supporting the draft resolution.

Mr. Slade (Samoa): This is the first opportunity I have had to speak in this Committee, and I want to take advantage of it to express to you, Sir, the happiness of my delegation and our full satisfaction in working under your chairmanship.

I want also, if I may, to record the very deep shock and sadness of my Government and of our delegation at the tragic passing of Prime Minister Rabin. May the legacy of this great man of peace live on and bear fruit for all the children of Israel.

Samoa has no hesitation in adding its voice and its support as a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, on nuclear testing. I must say that we would have preferred a resolution with stronger language on this important issue, but in the interest of consensus, we would add our vote in support of this text.

As a member of the South Pacific Forum, we associate ourselves fully with the statement delivered by our leader, the Ambassador of Papua New Guinea. This is an issue of the utmost importance to my country, and one about which my Government holds very strong views and has very strong concerns. Samoa believes very deeply that the greatest step which we can take towards our common goals of international peace and security is through the complete and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

However, these important and fundamental goals are being severely jeopardized by the action of some nuclear Powers which have potentially far-reaching and disastrous effects for us all. Like so many in this room, we worked hard for the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and we fully support the current negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test- ban treaty. These are important historical milestones, indeed, in the process of our common search for world peace. But, as far as Samoa is concerned, these goals are being severely endangered by the current nuclear-testing programmes. They are completely incompatible with strongly worded assurances and undertakings given by the nuclear-power

States at the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the case of France, its testing programme is in direct contravention of the legal obligations of France under the Noumea Convention, which prohibits radioactive pollution in the South Pacific. But, even more important, this testing is being carried out with complete and callous disregard for the health of the people of French Polynesia, and with disregard for the health and the environment of my people and our region.

Of all of the Members of the United Nations, my country is located closest to the test site. As we have heard in this Committee this morning, the leaders of the Pacific region have been consistent in their condemnation of French nuclear testing in our area. We, too, want to repeat their extreme outrage. The people of the Pacific have had a long history of suffering from the effects of nuclear testing. Look at what has happened in the Marshall Islands. We have seen first-hand from past experiences, such as the Chernobyl disaster, how radioactive pollution cannot be confined to the primary site. And for the Pacific region, where small island nations are linked by ocean currents and tropical sea breezes, the disastrous effects of nuclear testing are immense. This becomes not just a regional but also a global problem of very huge proportions.

There is a significant body of scientific opinion that contradicts the complacency of assurance by France that there is no danger from its underground nuclear tests.

Samoa is deeply appreciative of those nuclear-weapon States that have continued their nuclear-testing moratoriums. We strongly condemn and reject all current and future nuclear testing, and we call especially on France to stop immediately — and to do so in the face of worldwide international and regional condemnation.

Lastly, we strongly appeal to all delegations to join us in supporting and in sponsoring this very important draft resolution.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Pakistan to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.6.

Mr. Munir Akram (Pakistan): I have asked to speak to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.6, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

In 1972, when inaugurating Pakistan's first nuclear power reactor in Karachi, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, advanced the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. After the Pokharan nuclear explosion of May 1974, Pakistan reiterated this proposal. We were gratified that the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the creation of such a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia in its resolution 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974.

This endorsement has been reaffirmed in the United Nations General Assembly by an ever increasing number of votes each year for the past 20 years.

Since the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is considered as an important component of the world community's endeavour to promote the twin goals of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It is ironic that while considerable progress has been made towards the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various other parts of the world, there has been no significant progress towards the Assembly's repeatedly affirmed objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

Pakistan warmly welcomes the consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean — the Treaty of Tlatelolco — and the adoption by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) of the Pelindaba Treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. With the full implementation of the Rarotonga Treaty in the South Pacific, and the proposed creation of nuclear-free "peace zones" in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, the world community may well succeed in eliminating the production and the presence of nuclear weapons in the entire southern hemisphere.

Pakistan remains hopeful that a nuclear-weapon-free zone will, one day, become a reality in South Asia. All the States of South Asia have made unilateral declarations, at the highest levels, pledging themselves not to acquire, develop or manufacture nuclear weapons. What is needed is a sincere effort to transform these unilateral pledges into an effective and acceptable multilateral non-proliferation regime, as has been accomplished in other parts of the world.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/50/L.6 is designed to reaffirm the international community's firm support for the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. This objective is all the more urgent in view of

the tensions and conflicts that afflict this region, in which one fifth of humanity lives.

Various endeavours have been made in the course of the past several years to advance this objective, including proposals for five-Power and nine-nation multilateral talks on non-proliferation, security and related issues in South Asia. Pakistan will continue to work for agreement on some practical means of promoting the resolution of disputes, nuclear and military restraint and the goal of non-proliferation in the South Asian region.

It is the sincere hope of the delegation of Pakistan that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/50/L.6 will be adopted with the widest possible majority by the Committee and by the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. Edwards (Marshall Islands): At the outset, I wish to associate my delegation with the statements made by Mexico, Papua New Guinea and many other delegations on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3. I wish also to reaffirm the statements that my delegation has made in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, at the Special Commemorative Meeting and in this Committee.

Although many countries have congratulated the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States on their announcement last week that they will sign the relevant Protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga before the end of the first half of 1996, my delegation would have wished to see the Protocols signed a long time ago. Anything less than an immediate cessation of nuclear testing in the Pacific by France is unacceptable.

One nuclear-weapon test anywhere is one too many. A single test in the Pacific will add to the burden we will face in the future. In the interest of time, my delegation would refer the Committee to the statements I mentioned earlier.

Marshall Islands has joined in sponsoring this draft resolution because we must recognize that what is occurring is simply wrong, and we must put a stop to it.

Mr. Chua (Singapore): Singapore, together with many other States, is sponsoring the draft resolution on nuclear testing (A/C.1/50/L.3) under the agenda item "General and complete disarmament". It was only after careful deliberation that Singapore decided to co-sponsor this draft resolution, which we believe deals with one of the key issues facing, not only this Committee or the United Nations, but the entire global community.

Singapore is fully committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to disarmament. We regard the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the only international treaty aimed at containing nuclear proliferation, as one of the cornerstones of global security. That was why Singapore firmly supported the indefinite extension of the NPT at the Review and Extension Conference held in May this year. This decision was based on our belief that all States parties to the NPT, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should redouble their efforts to free the world of nuclear weapons and ensure a secure and peaceful global environment.

However, as is well known, negotiations at the NPT Review and Extension Conference were difficult. Although consensus was eventually reached, the difficult negotiations showed that it was a fragile consensus. The fact that nuclear tests were conducted immediately after the Conference, and despite widespread international protests, threatens to unravel this consensus. It was for that reason that Singapore supported the statement made by the Chairman of the Regional Forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which called on all those countries that were planning to conduct further nuclear tests to put an immediate end to such testing. We also continue to hope that all States parties to the NPT, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would abide by the agreement reached at the Review and Extension Conference to work towards the early conclusion of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1996 and to exercise utmost restraint in the meantime.

The draft resolution before us has a twofold objective: to express the international community's clear commitment to put an end to nuclear testing and to give encouragement for the speedy and satisfactory conclusion of the CTBT. We believe that a strong signal from the international community against nuclear testing will help move the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty forward. It is therefore important that the First Committee adopt this draft resolution with the widest possible support. A clear endorsement would not only strengthen the credibility of the NPT regime but help to promote nuclear disarmament and the realization of the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Mr. Ocampo (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Peru associates itself with the arguments put forward by the delegation of Mexico and by the other delegations that spoke earlier and which have co-sponsored

the draft resolution on nuclear tests contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3. Peru is also a co-sponsor of this draft resolution, which is now before the Committee for consideration.

The delegation of Peru is convinced that the resumption of nuclear testing contradicts the commitment and spirit of cooperation assumed by the international community last May when it decided in this very forum to extend indefinitely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). My delegation believes that this attitude is not likely to benefit negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and may, indirectly, prompt a similar attitude on the part of other countries that have a nuclear capacity.

Nuclear tests pose a potential risk to the health and security of the people of coastal States and to their natural resources and environment, contrary to the precautionary principle on international environmental law contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climatic Change, the Treaty of Maastricht and other international instruments.

The position of the delegation of Peru has consistently been identified with the position of the Pacific Basin countries. In accordance with its own realities and national interests, Peru is fully confident that the draft resolution introduced this morning by the delegation of Mexico will enjoy the widest possible support.

Mr. Larrain (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On behalf of the delegation of Chile I wish to speak about draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, which was introduced just now by the delegation of Mexico and co-sponsored by Chile. It is indeed distressing for us to have to do this, inasmuch as this text deeply deplores the acts of friendly nations with which we have relations of respect and cooperation.

From the time when China and, subsequently, France resumed their tests, we believed it to be our obligation to work, along with other countries, with a view to prevailing upon the General Assembly of the United Nations to pronounce overwhelmingly against these tests and request their immediate cessation.

Chile's action in this regard reflects its convictions deeply rooted in its foreign policy of commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, and at the same time the genuine and spontaneous reaction of indignation which the tests stirred up in Chilean public opinion.

The tests are taking place at a unique moment in contemporary history. The root causes of the nuclear-arms race have been profoundly transformed at the international level, and the threat of nuclear confrontation has been fading away. Chile believed that the threat could be revived only if the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were not extended indefinitely, thus leaving open the possibility that new centres of nuclear proliferation might appear at any time. For these reasons, Chile acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and expressed its satisfaction at its indefinite extension.

We believe that the recent nuclear tests go against the logic that inspired the international community to extend the Treaty. As we have repeatedly pointed out, the reason for any nuclear test is to prepare for a real detonation in a war situation. With the NPT extended indefinitely and the cold war buried like a bad memory from another age, it is surprising that such tests are being carried out today in circumstances that did not prevail even when the extension of the NPT was uncertain.

At the present juncture of international security the nuclear explosions do not provide more security to the country that carries them out. What they produce is a profound uneasiness and a sense of insecurity in other nations. It is particularly serious that this should be happening at a time when a comprehensive test-ban treaty is being negotiated in Geneva.

The current underground tests are politically inopportune — doubly so in that they are taking place only days after the two countries signatories of the NPT had solemnly committed themselves to exercise "utmost restraint". It is true that the expression "utmost restraint" (*NPT/CONF.1995/32, Part I, annex, decision 2, para. 4 (a)*), which appears in the Final Document of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, does not juridically entail a prohibition. None the less, one must ask whether it is "restraint" to carry out as many detonations as have been announced when the ink is still not dry on the NPT commitments, in a region of the world in which sensibilities are deeply offended and at a time when it would be impossible to carry out such tests in other regions.

Finally, we denounce the tests, not only because they are politically inopportune and unjustified, but also because they affect our security. We have fundamental interests in the South Pacific, and France cannot guarantee that the tests are harmless to the environment and to health. There

are well-founded indications that the structure of Muroroa Atoll could be suffering damage and, if that is the case, that radioactive leaks or other phenomena with unforeseeable consequences could occur.

Perhaps we shall not suffer today the terrible consequences of an ecological disaster resulting from these tests in the Pacific, but there can be no guarantee that it will not happen in the future. There is still time to avoid that risk, and every country must assume its responsibility to do so.

In the historic gathering of the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, held on 22 September last, the tests were denounced, and it was demanded that they cease immediately. Many other forums have joined in this request. Now it is the General Assembly's turn to raise its voice. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the General Assembly's pronouncement be by a large majority and unequivocal.

Mr. Musrasrik (Federated States of Micronesia): I wish to comment on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3, entitled "Nuclear testing", of which my delegation is pleased to be a sponsor.

At the outset, I wish to express my delegation's support for the remarks made by the representative of Papua New Guinea on behalf of the South Pacific Forum countries, as well as those made by the delegation of Mexico and other sponsors.

The issue of nuclear testing is of special concern to my Government. We have heard repeated testimony in this forum that the cold war is over. In this decade we have witnessed the easing of tension between States, leading to international relationships that were once unthinkable.

Nations large and small gathered earlier this year at the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to forge an environment of enhanced global security in connection with the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At that gathering the NPT was extended indefinitely in return for the commitment of utmost restraint by the nuclear Powers. Commitments were also made for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty by next year. My Government commends these actions, for they signal a positive process of nuclear disarmament and, certainly, the promotion of international peace and security.

However, just when international efforts seem to be on the right course towards the containment of the nuclear spectre, a self-interested few, reversing the direction of the disarmament process by conducting nuclear tests in our global environment, cannot but cause us to question the real value of the earlier commitments that gave us hope. The history of nuclear testing in the Pacific has chronicled the willingness of some nations to gamble with the lives and homelands of island inhabitants by conducting nuclear tests and engaging in other practices too hazardous to carry out at home.

We in the region of Micronesia — in particular our neighbour to the east, the Republic of the Marshall Islands — have felt the disastrous effects of nuclear tests on the health of our peoples. The contaminants remain in our environment, in our people and in our graves. Nuclear tests leave behind a legacy that does not know political boundaries and has a life span beyond that of our children and their great-grandchildren. The national security that a few States may hope to derive from nuclear testing cannot outweigh the certain suffering of many people and the devastation of their homelands and environment.

We support this draft resolution and its call for the cessation of all nuclear testing, and we urge other members to support it as well.

Ms. Mxakato-Diseko (South Africa): With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, which is before us, my delegation wishes to express its strong opposition to the current series of nuclear test explosions that have been conducted by two of the nuclear-weapon States. Despite repeated calls by the international community, further tests have been carried out. South Africa shares the international concern over the continued testing of nuclear weapons and once again strongly urges China and France to terminate their nuclear-testing programmes, abandon plans for future tests and join in a global moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, South Africa wishes to express its appreciation to those nuclear-weapon States which have maintained their commitment to the moratorium. South Africa's Government of National Unity feels strongly that the cessation of all nuclear testing will help in providing a favourable climate for the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by June 1996. The conclusion of such a treaty forms an integral part of the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament which was adopted by consensus at the 1995 Review and

Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) earlier this year. South Africa opposes nuclear-weapon testing as a matter of principle and we would like to see the draft resolution on this topic before us adopted by the First Committee and the General Assembly with the widest possible support.

Mrs. Bourgois (France) (*interpretation from French*): The Ambassador of Mexico introduced a draft resolution this morning on nuclear testing. With regard to its wording, as it now stands, France feels duty-bound to make certain comments: a draft resolution of this kind does not correspond either to the needs of the moment or to the simple requirements of truth and good faith. It does not meet the needs of the moment and, as many speakers have said, it is time to concentrate our efforts on reaching a comprehensive and definitive nuclear-test-ban treaty. That is why France co-sponsored the Australian draft resolution on the comprehensive test-ban treaty and that is why my country has publicly supported the zero option and was the first of the nuclear-weapon States to do so. Above all, France is working unrelentingly to ensure that the final text of this treaty shall be finalized as soon as possible — by 30 June 1996 at the latest and, if possible, even before that. The final version of the draft resolution introduced this morning no longer mentions 30 June 1996 as the date for the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty which was the only constructive part of the text. This being so, it leaves doubts as to the will of the authors to commit themselves as resolutely as we do to making the responsible moves that finalization of the text represents. They make it clear that their priorities lie elsewhere — in seeking to stir up emotions and controversy. It should also be time — I am sorry to bring this up again — for realism. The United Nations should take decisions regarding measures that can be taken immediately, instead of launching into rhetoric. We all know that in calling for the immediate cessation of testing, the authors of the draft resolution are not adopting an approach that can be given any consideration.

Moreover, what credibility can we give to the measures of a group of countries that are proposing to the Committee the adoption of a text which makes false assertions? This draft resolution puts forward the potentially negative effects on health and the environment. By suggesting that the French tests could have such effects, the draft resolution is disregarding the many studies carried out by independent and high-level scientists who have concluded that these tests are harmless. I would like to recall that very recently an Australian group of independent scientists submitted similar conclusions during the meeting of ministers for the environment of the South Pacific Forum in Brisbane held on 10 August 1995.

Moreover, this text emphasizes that the current tests are, allegedly, not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. This assertion is false. France has always stated that it reserved the right to complete its programme. The "utmost restraint" decided upon in May 1995 was not chosen just by chance. It did not apply to a halt or a moratorium. It related to the commitment to carry out the strict minimal number of tests. France is therefore fully respecting this commitment.

In sum, the text submitted to the Committee today will no longer be relevant tomorrow. Instead of bringing together the community of nations in the comprehensive task of urgently moving towards non-proliferation, disarmament and peace, it strives to maintain suspicion, doubt and antagonism through a very-short-term measure, which should be unacceptable here.

Mr. Tauwhare (United Kingdom): We have heard some emotional statements on the subject of nuclear testing today and in the course of the work of this First Committee, but I fear that in the process, many of the facts have been ignored and, indeed, distorted. I would like to concentrate, if I may, on one point in this draft resolution, and that is the assertion that nuclear testing is not consistent with the undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). When the language "utmost restraint" was negotiated, China and France made clear that it was not synonymous with a moratorium. Furthermore, China made quite clear that it intended to test, and France specifically reserved its right to do so if a new French Government should decide that it was necessary.

Now, the British Government is not under attack on this issue. We have not tested since the Review Conference and we have no intention of doing so. I hope, therefore, that it is possible for our delegation to stand up and say clearly that in the light of the negotiating history, the statement in the fourth preambular paragraph of this draft resolution:

> "that nuclear testing is not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"

is simply not true.

Mr. Choi (Republic of Korea): The Republic of Korea co-sponsored the draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 on nuclear testing for simple but clear reasons. First, my Government is strongly opposed to all forms of nuclear proliferation, be it vertical or horizontal. We are concerned that nuclear testing is likely to weaken the sanctity and credibility the non-proliferation commitment made by States parties in the wake of the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While the entire world benefits from the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is undeniable that the nuclear-weapon States benefit more than others. What is expected of the nuclear-weapon States at this stage is that they set an example by exercising the utmost restraint in nuclear testing, if only to strengthen the integrity and credibility of the global non-proliferation regime.

Secondly, nuclear testing goes against the spirit that made possible the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is time to move on to the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and to embark on nuclear disarmament, beginning with a serious effort to obtain a cut-off treaty with the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In this context, nuclear testing by some nuclear-weapon States runs counter to the rising expectations of mankind to live in a world free of nuclear weapons. We believe that the adoption of this draft resolution with the widest possible support will strengthen the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Mrs. Kurokochi (Japan): I should like to say a few words in support of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.31, which was introduced by the representative of Mongolia.

As I stated in the course of the general debate, Japan attaches importance to the activities and programmes conducted by the Regional Centre at Kathmandu, which constitute what is called a "Kathmandu process", to which Japan has been extending considerable assistance.

It is for this reason that Japan decided to become a sponsor, together with other interested countries in the region, of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.31. My delegation hopes that the draft resolution will enjoy the widest possible support when it comes to be voted on.

Mr. Starr (Australia): I would just like to clarify one or two points that have been made in the course of the meeting, in particular relating to views of Australian scientists regarding nuclear testing in the South Pacific. I would make the point quite clearly that these scientists stated in their report that information was inadequate, that they could not declare what the long-term effects of nuclear testing would be on the atoll environment and specifically that access was still less than complete, as was information on the subject.

In these circumstances concerns by States in the region are, in our view, eminently reasonable and I think it is appropriate for the international community to express, in draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, its deep concern regarding the potential damage to the environment and to health caused by underground testing.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of the Netherlands to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.18, on transparency in armaments.

Mr. Ramaker (Netherlands): During our thematic discussions last week, I expressed to the Committee some general thoughts relating to the concepts of confidence-building measures and transparency in armaments. Today I am returning to those issues and I intend to focus briefly on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.18, on transparency in armaments and, more particularly, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

This subject has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for a number of years. After the Register of Conventional Arms was established by General Assembly resolution 46/36 L it was adopted by consensus in the following years, as reflected in General Assembly resolutions 47/52 L and 48/75 E. Last year the General Assembly continued to support this concept with 150 votes in favour and none against.

The Register is at present a widely accepted confidence-building measure aimed at promoting openness, confidence and, therefore, greater stability among nations by providing the international community with official data on the international transfers of seven categories of conventional weapons. The last two reports of the Secretary-General containing the replies of Member States on their imports and exports of the conventional weapons concerned listed about 90 returns to the Register.

In his report of 13 October 1995 on the Register (A/50/547) the Secretary-General listed 84 returns thus far from Member States for the year 1994. On the basis of last year's experience, the total number of returns for 1994 can

be expected eventually to reach roughly the same level as in the two preceding years, possibly a little higher.

The assessment of the first three years of the operation of the Register remains positive. The level of participation this year, as in previous years, is encouraging. Although the number of replies continues to vacillate around little less than half the United Nations membership, the returns cover the bulk of the international arms trade in the seven categories of weapons to which I referred.

In 1992 and 1993, for instance, about 90 per cent of the arms transfers in question were reported. It is therefore safe to assume that most of the other half of the United Nations membership that did not reply did not export or import any of the weapons concerned. It is important, however, that Member States which have neither imported nor exported weapons also inform the Secretary-General of this fact because these so-called "nil" returns show that no arms have been transferred, which in itself should promote confidence. Moreover it indicates that the Member States concerned are willing to participate in this confidence-building exercise so that participation in the Register could, and should, be improved, while the participation, especially in certain regions and subregions, is of paramount importance, not only for the further consolidation of the Register itself, but of course also for confidence-building.

As far as expansion of the scope of the Register is concerned, the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts reaffirmed the goal of early expansion of the Register by the inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. But it could not reach agreement for such inclusion on the same basis as for transfers.

A growing number of States agree that the Register would become more complete and useful if it covered military holdings and procurement from national production. This means that, not only the continuing operation, but also the further development, of the Register will have to remain the subject of future review.

On behalf of the following countries, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.18, entitled "Transparency in armaments", on behalf of the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Samoa, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

Thus, I am happy to say that, once again, over a third of the United Nations membership has put its weight behind the present draft resolution.

Allow me, Sir, to explain briefly the main features and purpose of the draft resolution: the draft resolution is, in essence, a procedural one, aimed at maintaining the momentum of the Register of Conventional Arms and encouraging wider participation in it. In it the Assembly would reaffirm the determination of the international community to ensure the effective operation of the Register and, as was the case in preceding years, call upon Member States to provide the requested data by 30 April annually.

Furthermore, the General Assembly would reconfirm the decision in last year's resolution 49/75 C, adopted by an overwhelming majority, to convene another group of governmental experts in 1997 to review the operation of the Register and its further development.

Thirdly, the Conference on Disarmament would be invited to consider continuing its work in the field of transparency in armaments. At the 1995 session of the Conference it was not possible to resume work on the subject for reasons largely lying elsewhere. We do hope that next year the Conference will find the opportunity to continue its work on this important subject of transparency in armaments. Both the Register and the work in the Conference on Disarmament are only a few years old. Experience has shown that multilateral disarmament needs time to mature.

In this draft resolution, the aim of the sponsors is to confirm the widespread support the Register has acquired in recent years. In this respect, I am encouraged by the solid support for the concept of transparency in armaments, as embodied in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, as expressed both during the general debate and in the thematic discussions last week.

Mr. de Icaza (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation wishes to make some clarifications with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, which I had the honour of introducing this morning.

I believe that the motivation is not a privilege of any one of the members of this Committee. I should like to point out that nowhere does the draft resolution say that nuclear tests — underground tests — are without any doubt and with full certainty a danger to health and the environment. The draft resolution says that there is concern about the potential effects; it cannot be denied that such concern exists. It has been manifested and declared by Heads of State, by meetings of Heads of State, by regional organizations, by the international community. The concern is a fact, and this is entirely in keeping with truth and good faith. The draft resolution says that nuclear testing is not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It does not say that this is a violation: it says that it is not consistent; and this is a matter of interpretation, it is not a matter of incontrovertible truth or of good faith.

The draft resolution does not say that we are not going to conclude negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty within the dates mentioned in another draft resolution, which my delegation will be presenting tomorrow. The draft resolution says that we are convinced that the cessation of nuclear tests will provide a favourable climate for the conclusion of negotiations, and we are convinced of this, and in doing so we are not failing in truth or in good faith.

The draft resolution urges the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing and deplores current testing. It is not a question of a passing phenomenon: at no time does it say that it is for a year that nuclear testing should cease. No delegation here can assure us that, when the General Assembly meets next year, there will not be any nuclear Power carrying out tests.

We the sponsors of the draft resolution are not failing in our duty to the truth or in good faith: it is others who are thus failing.

Mr. Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation wishes to make a few comments on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.18.

My delegation wishes to point out that we fully share the concerns that have been mentioned in the draft resolution. We were not a sponsor, but we will certainly support it. However, we should like to emphasize the fact that expansion of the Register should take into account, not only existing stockpiles and production in weapon-producing States, but also the idea that the categories covered by the Register should be extended too. Here I would like to share with you a concern on the part of a Central African country. In the course of a seminar on the Register organized recently, it was pointed out that the Member States of this region did not contribute to the Register *inter alia* because the categories of weapons covered by the Register did not concern the majority of the Member States of the region. And in this regard, we wondered if it might be necessary to suggest the idea of a second register: it could cover States of the subregion or those States directly concerned by the proliferation of small weapons.

I would like to draw this to the attention of the Committee to suggest that the concept of expansion should not apply solely to existing stockpiles, but also to the nature and category of weapons covered in the Register.

Mr. Laptsenak (Belarus) (*interpretation from Russian*): I would like to speak very briefly on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.18.

With all that is going on we clearly need to increase the transparency in regard to armaments. Belarus, as has been stated by other States, was among the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.18, on transparency. The broad number of sponsors of the draft resolution testifies to the relevance of the issues raised in it. We submit information to the Register regularly. We believe the number of countries is growing and we call upon all States to support this draft resolution and to adopt it by consensus.

The Chairman: I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): As a number of delegations have added their names to the list of sponsors since I read out the earlier list this morning, I will now read out the updated list, which of course incorporates the earlier ones also. The following countries have become sponsors of the following draft resolutions:

A/C.1/50/L.1/Rev.1: Chile, Mongolia, Nigeria, Portugal, Slovakia and Cambodia;

A/C.1/50/L.3: Botswana, Maldives, Panama, Paraguay, Thailand, Ukraine and Bhutan;

A/C.1/50/L.5: Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago;

A/C.1/50/L.7: Australia, Belarus, Canada, Germany, Côte d'Ivoire, Iceland, Mali, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Romania, Republic of Moldova, United Kingdom, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Denmark and Finland;

A/C.1/50/L.8: Ethiopia, France, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Philippines, Belgium, United States, Greece, Republic of Korea, Denmark, Nigeria, Estonia, Madagascar, Myanmar, Ukraine, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kazakstan;

A/C.1/50/L.9: Russian Federation, Republic of Moldova, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran and Kenya;

A/C.1/50/L.11: Mongolia, Argentina, Ethiopia, Kenya and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

A/C.1/50/L.12: Singapore, Sri Lanka and Poland;

A/C.1/50/L.13: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Honduras and Australia;

A/C.1/50/L.14: Chile and Peru;

A/C.1/50/L.16: Kenya and Kazakstan;

A/C.1/50/L.24: Japan;

A/C.1/50/L.15: Argentina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Cambodia; and

A/C.1/50/L.18: Armenia and Costa Rica.

I would also like to announce that a meeting of the interested delegations with respect to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.49, entitled "1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", sponsored by Sri Lanka, will be held today at 3.15 p.m. in Conference Room D.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

United Nations A/C.1/50/PV.15

General Assembly
Fiftieth session

Official Records

First Committee
15th Meeting
Tuesday, 7 November 1995, 3 p.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Erdenechuluun . . . . . (Mongolia)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Agenda items 57 to 81 *(continued)*

Consideration of draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Egypt to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.10.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt): As this is my first statement following the tragic assassination of the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, I should like to convey to the delegation of Israel the deepest condolences of the delegation of Egypt. The peace camp in the Middle East has lost a courageous champion. The whole world has expressed the hope that the assassination will add momentum to the peace process and will make the supporters of peace more determined. This message was clearly conveyed by President Mubarak to the world leaders gathered at the funeral when he said:

> "Only through our unwavering commitment to this objective can we truly honour the memory of this fallen hero of peace."

President Mubarak continued:

> "We must therefore redouble our efforts and reaffirm our obligation to continue the sacred mission to achieve a just and lasting peace."

It is my pleasure to introduce the draft resolution on agenda item 66. This item was inscribed in the agenda in 1974, at the request of Iran with the support of Egypt, and Egypt has traditionally sponsored the draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The draft for this session is contained in document A/C.1/50/L.10 of 3 November 1995.

The atmosphere prevailing in the Middle East today requires that the efforts of the international community to enhance the peace process through the early establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and to take all possible steps towards the eventual realization of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction be harnessed and consolidated. In this context, it should be recalled that President Mubarak was the first to launch an initiative on the question of freeing the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction — doing do in April 1990. The establishment of such a zone would undoubtedly generate the necessary conditions for enhancing peace and stability in the region.

For many years, Egypt has conducted extensive consultations with all regional partners, as well as with extraregional parties involved in the Middle East peace process. Egypt has submitted several proposals in all relevant forums, at the regional and international levels, with a view to advancing specific arrangements that could contribute to the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The latest of these initiatives was in the framework of the multilateral Middle East peace process, where we presented several proposals, in the context of the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, concerning provisions and elements related to the establishment of such a zone.

95-86564 (E)

This record contains the original texts of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, Room C-178. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

I find it necessary to recall here that for many years — since 1980, in fact — all the parties and all members of the General Assembly, including Israel, have accepted the principle of establishing the zone. Year in and year out, the draft resolution is adopted by consensus. The position adopted by Israel throughout these years has been that such a zone could be established only through direct negotiations between the parties concerned. We were happy to accommodate this position, and direct negotiations began more than three years ago in the context of the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.

However, up to now all efforts to achieve meaningful results have been unsuccessful. Israel blocked any serious consideration of the issue, holding it hostage to certain preconditions revolving round the undefined notion of "peace and reconciliation" with all the States of the region. We sincerely hope that this proposition is not a delaying tactic and that all the parties will be able to work together to achieve the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In order to clarify this point further, allow me to address four specific issues: first of all, the time-frame. My delegation believes that the negotiations of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group should be directed towards a comprehensive examination of all the related aspects of establishing the zone. We accept the argument that the required examination of modalities may prove to be time-consuming, but the point to be emphasized is the initiation phase. This phase is now — and not, as the representative of Israel said a few days ago in the First Committee:

> "the day when conditions in the region will be auspicious for the launching of discussions on a nuclear-weapon-free zone". (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, First Committee, 8th meeting, p. 4*)

The second point is the relation between peace and security. Our position on this point is that total and comprehensive peace requires taking into consideration in a reciprocal manner the legitimate security concerns of all the parties — and not, I repeat not, the concern of one party at the expense of other parties. In this respect, I should like to stress that the security concerns of the Arab States, as a result of the existing Israeli unsafeguarded, and, I would add, aging nuclear capabilities, are far greater than any Israeli security concern with respect to the Arab States.

The third point is the territorial scope of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, and this is a point of great importance. Who are the parties concerned? The answer to this question emanates from the scope of application of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in which the Council called on the parties to work out security arrangements together. That resolution was addressed to the States involved in the 1967 hostilities. It is generally recognized that Iran is within the geographical definition of the Middle East region. However, it has to be pointed out that the territorial scope of such a zone could not be artificially extended to include many countries that are beyond the well-established definition of the Middle East.

The fourth point is the relation to the peace process. My delegation maintains the view that establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is one of the prerequisites for a successful peace process. The establishment of such a zone should be an integral component of the peace equation.

In this context, we are ready to consider what was stated by the Secretary-General in the last paragraph of his report on this agenda item:

> "In my view, progress on steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should neither lead nor lag behind inter-State negotiations on the broader aspects of a peace settlement. Rather, the two should proceed in parallel." (*A/48/399, para 22*)

It is for this reason that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons devoted a special resolution to the Middle East, as a clear indication of the serious concern of these States over the situation in our region, resulting — as stated in operative paragraph 3 of that resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference — from

> "the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities". (*NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex, Resolution on the Middle East, para. 3*)

The decision stated further, in operative paragraph 5:

> "Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, *inter alia*, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and

biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective." (*NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex, Resolution on the Middle East, para. 5*)

Regrettably, and notwithstanding the aforementioned developments, and notwithstanding also the principles and provisions of relevant and successive General Assembly resolutions since 1974, the establishment of the zone remains unrealized. We, in turn, ask how many more years, and how many more resolutions, do we need to implement the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East?

We note that since 1980 this resolution has been adopted both in the First Committee and in the General Assembly by consensus. Consensus, no doubt, entails a commitment to work on the basis of the resolution and not to present differing interpretations to block its practical implementation. The so-called "step-by-step approach" — beginning with confidence-building and security measures, establishing peaceful relations and, after establishing peaceful relations, in due course complementing the process by dealing with conventional and non-conventional arms control where appropriate — is not acceptable to the Arab States. There is a need for mutual consideration of the priorities, with a view to achieving lasting peace in the Middle East.

In introducing this draft resolution, which is an updated version of last year's resolution, the delegation of Egypt exercised the utmost self-restraint and refrained from adding new paragraphs reflecting the concerns to which I have alluded in the course of this statement.

Our objective, and our most sincere hope, is to maintain the existing consensus on the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, thus allowing more time for the reconsideration of positions. Lest I be misunderstood, by "more time" we mean the next few months — and I will refer to this in a moment.

All the concerned parties within the Middle East region, that is, Iran, Israel and the Arab States, should engage seriously, and without any further delay, in negotiating the practical arrangements for the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone within the forthcoming year.

Let me add that this year the First Committee is going to adopt a draft resolution with an annex on the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. In that draft resolution, there is more than one reference to the importance of achieving as soon as possible another zone free from nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The hope of my delegation is that as we are adopting this year the resolution on the African zone, we will be able by next year to adopt a resolution on the Middle East zone, and I think the political atmosphere is very auspicious. If we have the will, we shall be able to undertake this very important task.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Mali, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29.

Mr. Diawara (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): At the outset, on behalf of my delegation, I wish to convey to the Israeli delegation our deepest condolences on the loss of their Prime Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin.

I have the honour and pleasure to introduce to this Committee draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29, on behalf of its sponsors. The purpose of this text is to assist States in curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. As members can see, it is sponsored by 21 countries, whose legitimate aspirations accord with those of other Member States of the international community in the face of a global phenomenon that is growing day by day.

I must say, however, that this draft resolution is not only the draft of its sponsors. The draft is ours — that of all the States represented here, which, with much clear-sightedness, adopted it last year by consensus.

It is precisely this concern for consensus that prevailed in the drafting of the version that is submitted for the Committee's consideration, and that is why this version is almost unchanged compared to resolution 49/75 G of 15 December 1995. The slight changes in format made to the draft are intended mainly to bring the document up to date, taking account of the time that has elapsed since the last session. Indeed, following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 49/75 G, the Secretary-General of the United Nations undertook to implement that resolution by dispatching an advisory mission to those countries most affected by the volume of illicit traffic in small arms.

The draft before us takes this evolution into account and attempts to reflect it in the preamble as well as in the operative section. However, it has an additional operative paragraph 4 that conforms with the title of the draft resolution. In this paragraph the Secretary-General is requested to provide the requisite assistance for the implementation in the countries concerned of the relevant

recommendations contained in the report of these advisory missions. We feel, therefore, that it is logical to ensure the implementation of these recommendations so that observations on the ground may be followed up with concrete measures in order to contain the scourge of the accumulation, circulation and illicit export of small arms in our subregion.

It has been recognized that the issue of small arms is today a global scourge, and we would agree. But we also need to recognize that the situation in our countries is a very specific one, because it relates to their existence as independent and sovereign States. Indeed, the survival of these States and of the new institutions that most of them have established, or are in the process of establishing, will depend on their ability to guarantee the safety of their populations through the maintenance of internal security.

We need also to recognize the specific nature of the situation in our countries because these are countries with very limited resources, most of which are unable to preserve their own stability in the face of any group that is equipped with a stockpile of small arms. In Africa, armies can change the course of history in a country simply by acting on motives far removed from the real concerns of the peoples. That is certainly one characteristic peculiar to Africa — a sad one, I must admit.

It is thus urgent for the international community to establish a code of conduct by creating the appropriate mechanisms to curb the illicit traffic in small arms. The lack of security and the tragedies that we are seeing throughout the world are primarily due to this illicit traffic in small arms, which provides a comfortable existence for some at the expense of the blood and tears of millions of men, women and children. That is the thrust of our invitation to the international community, contained in operative paragraph 7, to give appropriate support to the efforts made by the affected countries to check the illicit circulation of small arms, which is likely to hamper their development.

Thus, the support of representatives for the draft resolution will be concrete evidence of international solidarity with our countries, which today are firmly committed to broad restructuring programmes, both political and economical. In this context, peace and security will be their most valuable assets.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Canada, who will introduce the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/50/L.12, A/C.1/50/L.14 and A/C.1/50/L.15.

Mr. Moher (Canada): I wish to speak at the outset to three draft resolutions that have been submitted to this Committee, and with your indulgence, Sir, I will speak later on a fourth.

With regard to the first draft resolution — in document A/C.1/50/L.12 — on "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", I wish first of all to acknowledge the long-standing view of this Committee of the critical nature of verification. In fact, in another draft resolution that is before this Committee — draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.42 — there is a paragraph in which the General Assembly would welcome the universal recognition of the critical importance of the question of compliance with, and verification of, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other obligations.

We fully agree with that, and, given the critical importance of verification, it is in our view necessary to keep the field under constant review and to examine new ideas and developments, to ensure that our knowledge is up to date and to draw on those reflections as much as possible and when appropriate.

The basis for the study that is before this Committee in document A/50/377, which is the background to our draft resolution, is resolution 48/68 of December 1993. Some 127 States supported that resolution; it had 22 sponsors. Pursuant to that resolution, experts from 16 countries participated in the two-year study, which, unanimously, sets out a number of concepts and recommendations for consideration by Member States.

In preparing draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12, Canada devoted major efforts to meeting all the concerns expressed by various members of this Committee in an effort to find a true consensus. We continue to be mildly bemused by those who continue to find difficulty with our final effort.

What does this draft resolution do? The preambular paragraphs affirm the Committee's continued support for the 16 principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission and stress the critical importance of verification and compliance, echoing a comment I made a few minutes ago.

In operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly would note the report of the Secretary-General and commend it to

the attention of Member States — hardly a provocative provision. In operative paragraph 2 it would request the Secretary-General to give the report the widest possible circulation and to seek the views of Member States. In operative paragraph 3 Member States would be encouraged to consider the recommendations contained in the report and to assist the Secretary-General in their implementation where they consider it appropriate. The Secretary-General is requested to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session — two sessions from now.

What the draft resolution does not do is endorse all of the recommendations contained in the report, direct any specific endorsement of ideas or mandate the expenditure of resources.

We regret and apologize for the fact that, in our effort to meet the official deadline of Friday evening, we were unable to contact all delegations that had expressed support for this draft resolution, and we were therefore unable to give all of them the chance to sponsor it, as they had indicated they would like to do. In introducing this draft resolution to the Committee today, I welcome the support of all delegations, including any additional sponsorship.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.14, entitled "Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", it is worth recalling that in November 1992 resolution 47/39 was adopted without a vote. Thus, on a consensus basis, it commended the Convention, called upon all States to sign it, expressed the intention to bring it into force at the earliest date and called upon all States to ensure its effective implementation.

During the past two years, discussions — frequently difficult, we admit — have taken place at The Hague. These discussions should and will continue. We hope for an early conclusion. That, however, is the proper forum for the substantive discussion of issues relating to this Convention.

At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that nearly 50 States have already ratified the Convention, bringing it closer to entry into force, and Canada, for one, sees this as a highly positive development.

Against this background, Canada and Poland are proposing the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.14, now before this Committee. We consider it to be procedural, as it does not try in any way to shift the balance on substantive issues or to advance any substantive point of view. In operative paragraph 1 it merely welcomes the work done so far by the Preparatory Commission at The Hague and urges the early completion of this work. In operative paragraph 2 it urges States to sign the Convention, and in operative paragraph 3 it stresses the particular importance of its early entry into force, urging States, particularly those possessing chemical weapons, to ratify it as soon as possible.

Canada and Poland believe that this draft resolution can be strongly supported by all members of this Committee. We have almost 50 sponsors at this time, and we have welcomed indications of additional support. I recommend this draft resolution for careful consideration by all delegations, as we would like it to be a true consensus resolution.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.15, "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", I would again like to begin by briefly reviewing the history of this issue.

The concept has been discussed for almost 40 years. It has roots in both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The concept has been widely supported for many years, but it was not until the early 1990s that we in the international community were finally able to begin to make substantive progress. Resolution 47/39 of December 1992, a consensus resolution, launched the process, and there has been further progress since then. The Conference on Disarmament decided that it was the appropriate forum in which to pursue the issue, and it adopted the report of its Special Coordinator on this issue in March 1995. The Conference on Disarmament also decided to establish an ad hoc committee to initiate negotiations on the basis of that report.

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.15, now before this Committee, is entirely factual and does not attempt to address the substance of this issue, which will require careful negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore, in operative paragraph 1 it merely welcomes the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament at its 1995 session of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty — a statement of fact. It encourages and supports the efforts of Member States and Observers to the Conference on Disarmament to obtain the immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations. Finally, it decides to place this issue on the agenda of the General Assembly at its fifty-first session.

I think the draft resolution clearly recognizes that negotiations on this issue should get under way in 1996. It has strong support already, and we would welcome additional support.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the Committee for the careful attention that I hope all will give to these three draft resolutions.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Mexico, who will introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/50/L.2 and A/C.1/50/L.32.

Mr. de Icaza (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before I turn to the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/50/L.2 and A/C.1/50/L.32, allow me to make a few brief comments on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12, which has just been introduced by Canada. Verification is an essential component in the arms limitation and disarmament programme. Adequate and satisfactory verification of international agreements is essential for creating an environment of trust and security. When verification is multilateral, it offers an additional element of trust because of its independence and impartiality, in particular for countries which lack the national means independently to verify compliance by other States with their obligations.

The international environment is, at present, conducive to the development of cooperation activities and to the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations in areas promoting collective peace and security. The document prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Verification shows us that the participation of the United Nations in this area can be quite varied, but so far it is limited. The practical examples of verification known to us show that if there are too many organizations involved in these efforts, resources may well be wasted and mismanaged. The States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention are attempting to set up the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which will be entrusted with the task of verifying compliance with the regime established pursuant to the Convention. This process has not been easy and has been very costly. The lack of experience in establishing this kind of verification mechanism and the reticence still felt by some States are facts. However, it is hoped that we can lay the groundwork for the development of a "verification culture", which in the near future would lead to the establishment of a multilateral body to which States parties to a treaty could entrust the task of verifying compliance with its provisions.

Similarly, it will soon be necessary to set up a body to verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and there will be other requirements such as verification of the prohibition of biological weapons, of the production of fissile material for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons as well as other kinds of activities relating to various aspects of verification. The United Nations can play a decisive role, not only as a coordinator and information centre, but also in terms of gathering its own experience and passing it on to others.

The development of common verification services is the first step in a process which should lead to the creation of a United Nations body responsible for verification in all its aspects. This process will also help to fine tune and establish new technologies in this field, which may well benefit countries with fewer possibilities for allocating resources to this kind of research.

Verification is an evolving activity and our concept of this process today is broad in scope and content. The combination of various technologies, some of them involving advanced technologies, make verification today a much more reliable and viable activity. The suggestions made by the Group of Governmental Experts for the establishment of new principles and guidelines in the area of verification are particularly timely at this stage because they respond to new needs which we must satisfy.

We trust that the contributions made by Member States to the report submitted by the Secretary-General will round off the efforts made by the Group of Governmental Experts. This may well be considered as a step forward in our common task. We extend our thanks to the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts, Ambassador Peggy Mason of Canada, for the work carried out and the tenacity and efficiency with which she guided the work. We would also like to express our gratitude to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, in particular for the work carried out by the Secretary of the Group, Mrs. Olga Sukovitch.

My delegation supports draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12 and will vote in favour of it if a vote is needed, but we feel that it deserves to be adopted by the First Committee by consensus.

Allow me now to move on to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.2. Two years ago, my delegation submitted a draft resolution in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a brief report on the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of

vehicles for their delivery so that a representative governmental group of experts could consider it and make suggestions on future consideration of the report in the various multilateral disarmament forums. The report was drafted, but for various reasons it was not transmitted to a representative group of experts, which, as was said at the time, might well have been the Conference on Disarmament. This exercise has therefore remained incomplete. We understand the reasons for the interpretations which prevented the draft from being put forward in 1994 but we feel that the extreme importance of this issue should prompt us to seek the necessary means to ensure its completion.

My delegation feels that the need to deal with the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is a constant concern in the various multilateral disarmament forums, and the interest of countries in its various aspects is quite evident. If we are going to have universal and non-discriminatory mechanisms then we need to discuss issues such as the review of recent developments in arms limitation and disarmament and the potential for progress, the verification of non-proliferation regimes, the role of sanctions in these regimes and trade in technology and dual-use materials, to mention but a few.

Mexico is convinced that a multilateral approach to consideration of the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most appropriate tack to take because the States it concerns would be involved. The drafting and strengthening of the international standards on weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles should be treated as a priority.

The efforts made by the international community to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles are quite evident. We have noted this in the work of the Security Council quite often and we saw it for real during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the final analysis, the indefinite extension of that Treaty is just one means among others of achieving this general objective.

The various international treaties in force on weapons of mass destruction are involved in a dynamic process of review and that means that we need constantly to consider ways to improve their functioning. That is the case for the NPT and at the most recent Review and Extension Conference, States parties decided to carry out a nuclear disarmament programme and to set up a mechanism for improving review of the Treaty. The Biological Weapons Convention is also being analysed in depth. These activities are and will continue to be the fruit of decisions adopted during negotiations in the multilateral forums and not just the efforts of some States.

For these reasons, my delegation is submitting draft decision A/C.1/50/L.2 to ensure that the item remains on the agenda of the General Assembly and we look forward to the Committee's support so that we can continue our consideration of this important subject.

We now move on to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.32. My delegation is pleased to introduce for the First Committee's consideration this draft resolution entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water", on behalf of Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Mexico.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty continues to be one of the greatest priorities for the international community as a means to halt the sophistication of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament within the process of achieving the complete elimination of this category of weapon of mass destruction. Last year, the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad Hoc Committee mandated to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. During the Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear-weapon States reiterated their commitment to conclude a comprehensive ban no later than 1996. Undeniable progress has been made to date in the negotiations on various substantive areas of the rolling text. The magnitude of the remaining task, however, requires us to redouble our efforts and to intensify the negotiations to achieve the objective within the agreed time-frame.

At the same time, the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty are continuing to work actively towards the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Consultations are being pursued on the progress achieved in the negotiations and they have not ruled out a reconvening of the Amendment Conference some time in the future. The Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Ambassador Alatas, in his capacity as President of that Conference, has been mandated to pursue consultations to that end, since, as was established at one meeting:

"The work of the Amendment Conference must continue alongside the work of the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive test ban, so that they can be mutually supportive and complementary."

The draft resolution before us this year varies in length and content from that submitted last year. It contains five preambular paragraphs that incorporate the main ideas and objectives of the initiative that first led a group of countries, including my own, to submit it several years ago. In the operative part, States that have not already done so are urged to adhere to the partial test-ban Treaty. States parties to the Treaty are urged to contribute to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as soon as possible and no later than 1996 and to its expeditious entry into force. The President of the Amendment Conference is requested to conduct consultations to those ends and it is decided to include this item in the provisional agenda of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.32 are convinced of the importance of keeping the path of the Amendment Conference open as a precaution in the event — which we hope will not come to pass — that the efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty do not achieve the success we all hope for. As in previous years, we hope that this initiative will enjoy the broadest support in the First Committee.

Mr. Jusuf (Indonesia): My delegation would like to associate itself with the statement made by Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico when he introduced the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.32 concerning the amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. My delegation is pleased to be one of the sponsors of that draft resolution.

We are gratified to note that the question of the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty is again featured in our agenda. As members may recall, under the mandate entrusted to him, the President of the Amendment Conference has continued the consultation in moving towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is our common goal. These endeavours have been undertaken in the context of the mutually supportive and complementary efforts of the Conference on Disarmament. It is of the utmost importance that the momentum generated by the Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which called for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996, should be seized and should respond positively to the collective will of the international community for a permanent ban on nuclear testing.

After years of frustrating and sterile controversy, there is a consensus among Member States belonging to various regions that the time is long overdue for renewed and determined action to realize the goal of banning all nuclear tests in all environments and for all time. It is therefore critical that talks should proceed rapidly towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this, the role of the vast majority of non-nuclear States should not be marginalized. Rather, these States should be allowed to make their contribution to the achievement of the long-sought goal.

It is also essential that, in addressing this question, we bear in mind the developments, both positive and negative, that have taken place and which have a profound bearing on this question. Similarly, we should also like to take into account the consultations of the President of the Amendment Conference to address relevant questions and to explore the possibility of a broad consensus on specific steps leading to the reconvening of the Amendment Conference. In this context, we welcome operative paragraph 3, which requests the President of the Amendment Conference to conduct consultations with the sole objective of contributing to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible.

In conclusion, my delegation is confident that, through such an approach, we can move closer to realizing the objective that we set more than three decades ago.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Japan, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.17.

Mrs. Kurokochi (Japan): I should like to say a few words in introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.17, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons".

Last year, at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Japan introduced a draft resolution under the same title and it was adopted by an overwhelming majority. We believe that that resolution contributed to the reaching of an agreement on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), because its most important concept, which was embodied in its title, was reflected in the Principles and Objectives adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

This year, Japan is sponsoring a draft resolution with the same title as a follow-up to last year's resolution, taking into account the results of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The content of this year's draft resolution is similar to that of its predecessor, except for references to the results of the said Conference and for operative paragraph 2.

Japan strongly hopes that during this fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations the international community will show clear determination in pursuit of disarmament. We would like this draft resolution to be adopted without a vote, if possible, or by a large majority.

Mr. Boros (Hungary): I should like to associate my delegation — as a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12 on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification — with the statement made by the representative of Canada. A Hungarian expert also participated in the elaboration of the study mentioned and we consider that the experts have done good work.

One of the most important questions we deal with in various disarmament forums is that of verification. We have verification systems of different efficacy attached to a lot of treaties and we are working on some very important ones, for example in Geneva. We think that the study is an important contribution to these questions. The recommendations and their implementation, where it is appropriate, can contribute to confidence building and security. That is why Hungary is a co-sponsor of the draft resolution.

We believe that knowing the views of Member States on the study and actions taken on that basis in a two-year term would be a good continuation of that work and an adequate contribution to the question of verification.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Canada, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13.

Mr. Moher (Canada): I can be much briefer this time. Speaking to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13, on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields, I wish first of all to state that we recognize fully that this is a sensitive and delicate issue.

Canada and Brazil, as the co-sponsors of this draft resolution, fully recognize this sensitivity and we want to re-emphasize the importance of trying to articulate, in the most widely acceptable way possible, the appropriate relationship between recognition of the importance of science and technology uses and transfers for peaceful purposes and the need to ensure that science and technology are not diverted to non-peaceful purposes. We believe that in achieving that objective — that is, of articulating the widest possible way for that appropriate relationship — constructive dialogues of all kinds are essential.

Resolution 49/68, adopted one year ago, in December 1994, with a vote of 166 in favour, none against and 5 abstentions, already indicates that there was very wide support for these efforts. Canada continues to regard this topic as one of key importance. Our national objective is to secure instruments in this field that are as comprehensive, effective and internationally agreed as possible. As part of that objective, we have tried to promote an ever larger consensus around the ideas addressed in the draft resolution before the Committee.

In cooperation with Brazil, we have worked strenuously this year to find a basis for such a wider consensus and we wish to thank those who helped us in this regard. We believe that we have developed a very straightforward draft resolution, one that invites an enhanced dialogue with a view to two objectives. The first is to ensure implementation of relevant commitments already undertaken under international legal instruments; the second is to explore ways and means of further developing international legal rules on transfers. We consider the draft resolution to be a positive statement of obvious objectives and we believe that it should be universally acceptable.

We have nearly 30 co-sponsors at this point. We call on additional members of this Committee to support it and, obviously, we welcome further co-sponsorship.

Mr. Felicio (Brazil): At the outset, let me thank the delegation of Canada for introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.13.

The First Committee is now addressing an issue of great concern to Brazil and to other countries interested in disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the fields related to weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and biological — and their delivery systems. I am referring to the rules for the transfer of technology with potential non-peaceful applications that can also have important civilian uses. The transfer of dual-use technologies has been the subject of sometimes difficult negotiations in the Disarmament Commission as well as in the context of the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, among other legal instruments.

Brazil has always considered that the objectives of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and access to advanced technology for peaceful purposes are not contradictory. On the contrary, they may be mutually reinforcing, and this is the approach that has been followed by the United Nations at least since the "Atoms for Peace" initiative and the negotiation of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The objective of the series of proposals Brazil has presented on this matter over the past few years was to call on the international community to keep building upon existing rules and standards, which may play a necessary role, but which also need to be permanently reassessed and improved. Most notably, it is absolutely indispensable to attract more active participation by developing countries in these discussions.

Brazil, together with Canada and other sponsors from both the developed and the developing worlds, is introducing again this year a draft resolution on this item. It is considerably shorter and simpler than resolution 49/68. It takes into account the positions of those countries which, from both sides of the fence, so to speak, expressed reservations about the text approved last year.

The draft resolution before us seeks to preserve the more basic elements of consensus on the issue, while inviting all Member States to enhance dialogue on the role of science and technology in international security. It carefully avoids going into the potentially controversial aspects of the subject. Among other changes, the paragraphs which were voted on separately last year were left out, since this issue is one on which consensus should be our goal. The draft resolution does not endorse, nor indeed criticize, any particular set of measures or international instrument. What it does, in essence, is to encourage all States to renew efforts for broadening international consensus on transfers of high technology.

We are convinced that adoption of this draft resolution and continued dialogue on the role of science and technology in international security are necessary for the international community as a whole. This resolution will keep an important issue on the agenda of the General Assembly and help prepare the way for a more substantive dialogue in the future. We would like to see it approved without a vote, in view of the efforts of the sponsors to eliminate possibly controversial issues from the draft. If consensus should prove to be impossible, we expect that a very large majority will vote in favour of the draft resolution, as in previous years.

Mr. N'Dri (Côte d'Ivoire) (*interpretation from French*): Côte d'Ivoire, along with several other States, is a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/50/L.29 entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them".

The illicit proliferation in small arms in sub-Saharan Africa in general and in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion in particular is today a sad reality, nurtured, *inter alia*, by the emergence of many internal conflicts throughout the continent. The insecurity promoted by the illicit circulation of small arms is increasing dramatically, threatening the stability of our subregion and endangering the emerging democracies in that part of the African continent. The States of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion, on the basis of the results of the two United Nations Advisory Missions sent to the countries concerned, are determined to increase regional cooperation in the strengthening of security.

Côte d'Ivoire intends to take national measures to curb the illicit traffic in small arms, but we are convinced that the support of the international community is vital to the eradication of this scourge. It is for all these reasons that my delegation supports the draft resolution introduced by Mali and requests other States to provide, as they have done at previous sessions, their full support of the draft resolution on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them.

Mr. Dembinski (Poland): I have asked to speak in support of the four draft resolutions that have just been introduced by Canada: A/C.1/50/L.12 on verification in all its aspects; A/C.1/50/L.13 on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament; A/C.1/50/L.14 on the status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and A/C.1/50/L.15 on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. My delegation is happy to be among the sponsors of these draft resolutions.

Poland is one of framers of the 16 principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission and subsequently elaborated by the Group of Governmental Experts on Verification in All its Aspects, including the Role of the United Nations in that area. We believe that the Secretary-General should be commended for his report bringing this study to the attention of the United Nations Member States.

We believe that effective verification of arms control and disarmament agreements is an indispensable component of, and precondition for, confidence that agreements concluded in good faith are indeed scrupulously complied with by all States concerned. Without such trust and confidence, no disarmament agreement can be truly workable. We therefore support the efforts to bring the recommendations set forth in the report to the attention of Member States. We believe that the wide dissemination of knowledge will serve the interests of disarmament and international security.

Poland is a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13, on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament, since we believe that the promotion of progress in science and technology for peaceful applications should be seen as an obligation to make the dividends of disarmament available to all States, especially the developing ones. At the same time, we recognize the need to explore further the ways and means of accomplishing this goal without the risk of such technologies being diverted to other than peaceful purposes.

Like many other members of the Conference on Disarmament, Poland welcomed with satisfaction the important meeting of minds that the ban on the production of fissile material — the "cut-off" — should be addressed by that body and the fact that to this end an Ad Hoc Committee was established with an agreed mandate. Our satisfaction came from our strong conviction that a cut-off agreement would represent another important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime and promoting the goals of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. We continue to believe that negotiations on a cut-off and their successful conclusion would be in the interests of those important overriding goals of the international community.

Last but not least, the Polish delegation, as one of the original sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.14 on the status of the Chemical Weapons Convention, would like to join the representative of Canada in his appeal to all delegations to join in adopting that draft resolution. Its adoption by consensus would constitute a clear message from this Committee concerning the importance that the international community attaches to the effective banning for all time of this category of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Brahim (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation is, naturally, a sponsor of the draft resolution on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. As is well known, Chad has experienced many years of conflict and is burdened by the proliferation of small arms. We therefore fully support draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29, introduced by the representative of Mali.

Once again, we would appeal to the international community to support this draft resolution and to make greater efforts to assist the countries involved to free themselves from these weapons, which pose a constant threat to the civilian population and hamper social and economic development.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Pakistan to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.39.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): On behalf of the sponsors I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.39, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Paragraph 56 of the Final Document of the first special session, on disarmament states:

> "The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." *(resolution S-10/2, para. 56)*

The Final Document goes on to state, in paragraph 57:

> "Pending the achievement of this goal ... the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war ..." *(Ibid., para. 57)*

Finally, paragraph 58 states:

> "In this context, all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear

> war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement ..." (*Ibid., para. 58*)

Since 1978 the General Assembly has asked the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an international agreement to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is unfortunate that despite the passage of so many years it has not been possible to reach agreement on an international instrument to provide credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The assurances offered in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), as well as those contained in statements made at the first special session on disarmament, were all conditional and qualified. They offered no guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Although the cold war is over and the impediments of the rival military alliances have been removed, the nuclear-weapon States have yet to provide unconditional, universal and legally binding guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. This year, prior to the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear-weapon States made unilateral statements on assurances, which were then incorporated in the form of positive and negative security assurances in Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to recall that the Pakistan delegation has already pointed out the shortcomings of that resolution. First, the statements of four of the five nuclear-weapon States provide only conditional and qualified assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Only the Chinese assurances are unconditional and unqualified. Secondly, the assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States envisaged under the Security Council resolution is subject to multiple veto by the five permanent members of the Council. Therefore, those assurances are not credible. Thirdly, the assurances are not universal but are restricted only to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT. This is inconsistent with the United Nations Charter, which provides for unconditional and comprehensive security assurances to all States, individually by Member States or collectively through action by the Security Council. Finally, it is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, was excluded from consideration and finalization of these latest offers of security assurances.

There is widespread support among the non-nuclear-weapon States for the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of an internationally binding convention to provide assurances to these States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group of 21 has expressed its regret in the Conference that the Conference on Disarmament was not able to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Assurances during its 1995 session.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/50/L.39 endorses these objectives. It recalls the long history of the consideration of this question in the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament. It notes the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the views expressed thereon. Finally, it recommends that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations to reach an early agreement on this subject, taking into account the broad-based support for the conclusion of an international convention.

May I take this opportunity to mention that there is one omission in the text of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.39. The fifteenth preambular paragraph should read:

> "Taking note of the relevant decision of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held from 18 to 20 October 1995 and also ..."

after which the text would continue unchanged with "of the decision adopted by the Tenth Conference" and so on. This was a simple oversight in the presentation of the text. I apologize for it and hope that it will be reflected in the final version of the draft resolution.

It is the hope of the Pakistan delegation that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.39 will be adopted unanimously by the Committee and the General Assembly.

Mr. Abarry (Niger) *(interpretation from French)*: As this is the first time I have spoken at this session, I should like to begin by congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation, on your election to your high office and on your readiness to work with delegations to bring our work to a successful conclusion.

My delegation wishes to support draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29: "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them". It will be recalled that at the forty-ninth session, on the initiative of Mali, we adopted resolution 49/75 G, on the same question. The draft resolution introduced by Mali today is of even greater importance in the light of the fact that, in implementation of last year's text, the Secretary-General sent a mission to the countries of the subregion, including

Niger. The mission met with highly placed authorities in our countries and was able to assess the volume of the illicit traffic in small arms and the negative impact of such arms on the security of the populations.

The question of curbing the illicit traffic in small arms is of importance to countries in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion because its solution will strongly influence the efforts we are making to achieve development. Convinced, therefore, that other countries in other regions of the world will surely show interest in supporting this initiative, my country has once again this year co-sponsored the draft resolution, which, in substance, repeats the provisions that were approved by consensus last year. My delegation hopes that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29 will be adopted by consensus this year as well.

The Chairman: I now invite the Secretary of the Committee to make a statement.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): I would like to inform the Committee that the following States have become co-sponsors of the following draft resolutions:

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.1/Rev.1: Australia, Bangladesh and Singapore;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.8: Cyprus;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.11: Bangladesh and Hungary;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12: Bangladesh;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13: Bangladesh and New Zealand;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.14: Monaco;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.15: Monaco;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.16: Bangladesh;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.18: Ecuador;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.21: Cameroon;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24: Cuba;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29: Burkina Faso;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.31: New Zealand;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.32: Bangladesh, Benin and Brunei Darussalam;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.33: Kenya and Brunei Darussalam;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.45: Bangladesh and Benin;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.47: Malawi;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.48: Malawi.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

United Nations A/C.1/50/PV.16

General Assembly

Official Records

First Committee

16th Meeting
Wednesday, 8 November 1995, 10.00 a.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Erdenechuluun . . . . . (Mongolia)

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. de Icaza (Mexico), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

Agenda items 57 to 81 (*continued*)

Consideration of draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Acting Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The first speaker is the representative of Turkmenistan, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.9. I now call upon her.

Mrs. Ataeva (Turkmenistan) *(interpretation from Russian)*: My country, Turkmenistan, has expressed its desire to make the policy of permanent neutrality the main principle of its foreign policy by giving legislative form to the will of its people. That principle is fully in keeping with the interests of the State, its prospects for development and its national, historic and geopolitical identity.

We continue to live in an unstable world rent by ethnic, territorial, religious and other conflicts. Since our country is located at the centre of a vast region that includes Central and South Asia, the Caspian Sea region and the Caucasus, we are constantly aware of the hot winds of such conflicts. Turkmenistan, a small and peace-loving State, is not involved in any ongoing conflicts and disputes, nor does it belong to any military alliances or blocs. However, history abounds in examples of small States that, against their will, have become caught up in the whirlwind of conflicts. We are convinced that by following a policy of neutrality, good-neighbourliness and cooperation, Turkmenistan will ensure its national interests to the maximum extent and will also contribute to the strengthening of stability and peace throughout the world. By pursuing that policy Turkmenistan will be able to realize the economic potential latent in its huge natural resources.

Turkmenistan's historic choice has been supported by the summit meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Cooperation Organization held in March of this year at Islamabad and endorsed in its final resolution. In October 1995 Turkmenistan's neutrality was unanimously supported by the Eleventh Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cartagena and was reflected in the resolution adopted by that Conference.

The choice of States to pursue a policy of neutrality is a sovereign right and prerogative. However, the importance and significance of recognition of, and respect for, such a status by the international community cannot be overestimated. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna laid down the foundations of Switzerland's permanent neutrality and in 1955 the Four-Power Conference did the same for Austria. The Government of Turkmenistan has made great efforts to achieve recognition of its policy of permanent neutrality by the international community, represented by its highest forum, the United Nations. At the same time, we are fully aware and would like to state, forcefully and unambiguously, that such recognition in no way implies any obligations on the part of the international community as regards guarantees of Turkmenistan's permanent neutrality, nor does it involve any financial decisions of any kind. The will of the people and the people's historic choice are the only and sole guarantee.

95-86576 (E)

This record contains the original texts of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, Room C-178. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

The Government of Turkmenistan proceeds on the assumption that firm commitment to the policy of permanent neutrality does not mean self-isolation. By promoting the peacemaking activities of the United Nations my country seeks to play the role of a neutral political entity to facilitate the civilized settlement of any dispute. In this connection Turkmenistan is facilitating the intra-Tadzhik political dialogue, supporting constructive resolution of the Afghan conflict and providing assistance in the implementation of economic-stabilization programmes in a number of countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Firm commitment to the norms and principles of international law enshrined in the United Nations Charter is an imperative of the foreign policy being implemented by neutral Turkmenistan.

On behalf of the people and the Government of my country, I should like to express my special appreciation to those States that have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution on Turkmenistan's permanent neutrality. I should like urgently to appeal to all Member States of the United Nations to support us at this crucial turning-point in our history and to adopt the proposed draft resolution.

The Acting Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I call on the representative of Pakistan, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.40.

Mr. Khan Maneka (Pakistan): I have the honour of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.40, entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels".

The draft resolution encompasses three important aspects of international security and arms control: first, the threats to international peace and security posed by conventional arms build-ups; secondly, the need to control conventional arms at the regional and subregional levels, because the build-up of arms at the regional level, particularly in regions of tension, aggravates existing conditions and increases the chances of outright conflict, which endangers peace and security; and thirdly, in order to address the issue of conventional arms in its regional perspective, a request to the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. It is this aspect of the draft resolution which makes it uniquely important.

It is a proposal to have a framework to actually control conventional arms. Until now the major effort has been directed, not at controlling conventional arms, but at instituting confidence-building measures and transparency, particularly in the areas of expenditures and transfers of conventional arms. We have pointed out the inherent shortcomings of this approach.

Substantive and meaningful measures for conventional arms control and disarmament have so far been undertaken in only one region.

The Acting Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I call on the representative of Sweden, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.34.

Mr. Ekwall (Sweden): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.34, on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

The sponsors of the draft resolution are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and my own country, Sweden.

On 22 December 1993, States parties to the Convention requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a review conference of the Convention and to establish a Group of Governmental Experts to prepare that Conference. As a matter of priority, the Group was given the task of preparing proposals for amendments to Protocol II of the Convention, relating to land-mines.

The Group of Governmental Experts held four meetings and completed its work by adopting a final report. This report was submitted to the Review Conference, which met in Vienna from 25 September to 13 October 1995.

The Chairman of the Review Conference, Ambassador Johan Molander of Sweden, will report to this Committee tomorrow on the progress made at the Review Conference and on his assessment of the work ahead.

Through the draft resolution I have the honour to introduce, the General Assembly would particularly

welcome the adoption by the Conference, on 13 October 1995, of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), annexed to the Convention. The General Assembly would also commend this Protocol to all States, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date.

It is with particular satisfaction that Sweden notes the adoption of the Protocol on laser weapons, since we have worked actively for a ban on blinding laser weapons for close to a decade.

The Review Conference was not able to complete its review of Protocol II in Vienna. It therefore decided to continue its work at resumed sessions in Geneva from 15 to 19 January and from 22 April to 3 May 1996. The General Assembly would take note of this decision and call upon the States parties to intensify their efforts in order to conclude negotiations on a strengthened land- mine Protocol.

The General Assembly would also welcome the national measures adopted by Member States relating to the transfer, the production or the reduction of existing stockpiles of anti-personnel land-mines.

The 1980 Convention has so far entered into force only for 50 States. Consequently, the General Assembly would urgently call upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties to the Convention and its Protocols as soon as possible, so that, ultimately, accession to these instruments would be universal.

We are faced with what is generally considered to be a land- mine catastrophe. This catastrophe requires concerted action. The various aspects involved — from production and transfer to use and clearance — are under consideration by the international community. It is also debating the possibility of an international ban on anti-personnel land-mines, although positions on this issue clearly differ.

At this session, the General Assembly will also adopt resolutions on a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines and on assistance in mine clearance. The present draft resolution deals with the equally fundamental issue of developing the international legal regime governing these weapons.

On behalf of the sponsors, I express the hope that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.34 will be adopted without a vote. By doing so, we would in particular send a clear message that no effort should be spared in securing a successful outcome of the Review Conference under way.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call now on the representative of Mexico, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.8.

Mrs. Rovirosa (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Three years ago, my delegation, together with the delegations of Australia and New Zealand, began a joint effort to gain the broadest possible support within the General Assembly for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In 1993 and 1994, we achieved unanimous adoption of resolutions that enjoyed an unprecedentedly large number of sponsors.

This year's draft resolution reproduces the basic elements of last year's text, taking account of new circumstances. By draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.8, the Assembly would welcome the continuing efforts in the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament, the significant contributions made by States participating in those negotiations, and progress in key areas. It would call upon all States to conclude, as a task of the highest priority, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty so as to enable its signature by the outset of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.8 consider this to be feasible in view of the commitment of all States to conclude negotiations on a treaty as soon as possible. To meet this commitment it will be necessary, as the draft resolution notes, for States to proceed to the final phase of the negotiation at the beginning of 1996 in order to complete the final text of the treaty not later than 30 June.

If the General Assembly supports this proposed timetable for the negotiations, it should state its readiness to resume consideration of this item, as necessary, before its fifty-first session in order to endorse the text of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The draft resolution contains a provision to that effect, along with a request to the Secretary-General to ensure the provision to the Conference on Disarmament of adequate administrative, substantive and conference support services for these negotiations.

The delegation of Mexico is honoured to submit for the consideration of the First Committee draft resolution

A/C.1/50/L.8, which is at present sponsored by 77 delegations.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call now on the representative of Australia, who will also introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.8.

Mr. Starr (Australia): I am delighted today to be joining with Mexico and New Zealand in introducing to the First Committee a draft resolution designed to underpin not simply the continuation of comprehensive test-ban-treaty negotiations in Geneva, but their successful conclusion by the northern summer of 1996 and the signature of the resulting treaty by the time we meet again in the autumn here in New York.

The reaffirmation by the international community of this intention, set out in paragraphs 2 and 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.8, is the obvious rationale for the draft resolution. This is a realistic objective. There will be long negotiating days ahead of us. But the rolling text contained in the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament (A/50/27) makes it clear that the Geneva negotiations have progressed dramatically since we first achieved a full and historic consensus here two years ago on the commencement of the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiation. A good treaty — the treaty we all need as a foundation for enhancing our individual security — is well within our collective grasp. Everyone knows this.

Secondly, this is intended to be a galvanizing objective. Achieving closure within the window of opportunity now before us requires the setting of concrete objectives for negotiators, objectives within which they can manage their resources and their overall participation. The coming year is not a year like any other. It will not be business as usual: 1996 is the year in which we, the international community, firmly intend to finalize a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the goal which has for decades floated frustratingly beyond our reach.

But let us be very clear. Even now, the comprehensive test-ban treaty will slip through our collective grasp unless we are galvanized into transforming the extraordinary political opportunity we now have into a real achievement.

This draft resolution is a necessary part of that transformation. Australia trusts that it will galvanize other preparations aimed at ensuring that the 1996 final phase of the negotiation is successful. We look to the nuclear-weapon States, for example, to pursue collectively and with determination their various and welcome public commitments to work for a fully credible zero-nuclear-yield comprehensive test-ban treaty. We look for this commitment to be expressed in specific text, and for all negotiating States to work hard to ensure that textual agreement on scope is complete by the outset of the 1996 negotiating session.

Thirdly, and above all, this draft resolution seeks to crystallize a shared objective. It does little more than articulate and put into understandable operational language the welcome political commitments given by all delegations engaged in the negotiations. The sponsors of the draft resolution believe that the time has come to spell out clearly the international community's expectation that the Conference on Disarmament will deliver a final product in the first half of 1996, to enable signature by the outset of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly. The credibility of our individual commitments is at stake. At the end of the day, do we really mean what we say about concluding and signing a comprehensive test-ban treaty and signing it in 1996?

Finally, this draft resolution is a milestone. It is the firm intention of the sponsors that this will be the last General Assembly resolution dealing with negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Next year, as we close one chapter of the life of the United Nations and enter its second half-century, we aim to have closed also the nuclear testing chapter, and to be opening a new chapter of international relations with a strong potential for the enhancement of the security of all. Next year, we expect to be speaking of the implementation of a treaty which, by then, will have been recently signed by the vast majority of the international community.

I hardly need to add that in addition to this powerful political symbolism, conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is important to the vast majority of delegations represented in this room as the first fruits of the programme of action agreed upon in May by States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It will be a litmus test of the collective preparedness of all States Parties to deliver what we have undertaken.

Australia expects consensus on this draft resolution. This is the time for us to reinforce and articulate a commitment we have all undertaken. Australia expects this commitment, expressed with the authority of the entire international community, to galvanize the considerable effort which will be required on all sides to bring the treaty home. We have missed out before, including in the trilateral negotiations of the past. Let us declare through

this draft resolution our determination not to squander the present opportunity, or to miss out again.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of New Zealand, who will also introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.8.

Mr. Rider (New Zealand): It is with great pleasure that I follow the representatives of Mexico and Australia to speak in support of the draft resolution on a comprehensive test-ban treaty contained in document A/C.1/50/L.8. I would like to say to the Acting Chairman that it gives me particular pleasure to offer this personal support while he is in the Chair. His work in coordinating efforts to produce a text which 77 countries in this Committee have been able to co-sponsor is much appreciated.

For many years, New Zealand has been working with its partners in submitting resolutions calling for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is a matter for satisfaction that, for the last two years, the annual resolution on the subject has been adopted by consensus. We look forward with great confidence to that same measure of agreement this year.

This text this year is short and straightforward. With the time-frame introduced, it reflects the way in which the expectations of the international community in nuclear matters have advanced in the last two or three years. Testing is no longer acceptable. The international community has agreed that it will be finished once and for all and on a comprehensive basis.

A consensus resolution setting a time-frame for completion of the text will mark a major step forward. It cannot be overemphasized how substantial and beneficial will be the effect of a comprehensive treaty in the area of non-proliferation and as a major achievement in our quest for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

I have been speaking about the future and in a positive way. I believe that I am justified in doing so. This is certainly not the time to be negative or cautious. New Zealand has been pleased with the results achieved this year in the negotiations on the treaty but much remains to be done. The momentum of the negotiations must be maintained. The task of concluding the text of a treaty is a matter of the highest priority. That task will be greatly assisted through the adoption by this Committee of a text freely accepted by consensus. Accordingly, I have much pleasure in joining with my Mexican and Australian colleagues in commending the text to the First Committee for favourable attention.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Peru to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24.

Mr. Guillén (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Peru is pleased to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24, entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean". The draft resolution is supported by South Africa on behalf of the African Group of States and by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. We trust that this year, as in the past, the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

The draft resolution has retained some elements of resolution 49/76 D and has included the following complementary concepts. First, reference is made to the critical financial situation affecting Regional Centres in the terms used by the Secretary-General in his report of August 1995 in reference to these Centres. Secondly, a request is made to the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), to promote the development of activities related to peace and education for disarmament through these Regional Centres.

Because of the severe financial limitations of which we are all aware, the Regional Centres may close down. This is a real and imminent danger that we wish to avoid. Since their establishment in 1986, the Centres have done outstanding work in that they have heightened the people's awareness of the need for disarmament and of the obvious relationship between the arms build-up and underdevelopment. In the immediate future, the Centres will continue to encourage disarmament and, at the same time, prepare integral doctrines on security in accordance with the specific conditions of the respective regions in which they operate. In this connection, it is particularly noteworthy to see the momentum the Kathmandu Centre has gathered, which is both cause and effect of indispensable political will and vital voluntary contributions. Both factors are crucial to the proper functioning of the Regional Centres.

In recent years, States Members of the United Nations have made unprecedented efforts to bring the Organization into line with new world realities. We have emphasized the deep-seated causes of international instability and insecurity and have come up with innovative approaches for dealing with them in terms of prevention. These efforts and these plans must be transmitted to civil society and the general public. The Regional Centres are in the best position to pass on this message, which must also help to promote the ideal of a culture of peace and its key component, education for peace. The UNESCO Culture of Peace Programme and its interest in working together with other international disarmament organizations through its information and communication system are compatible with the role of Regional Centres in disseminating information concerning disarmament. This link will make it possible to give new momentum to the efforts of the Centres and the United Nations to inspire and lead mankind towards a better world for all.

In the general debate in the Committee on 25 October 1995, my delegation stated that Peru was requesting the voluntary support of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as that of other countries from the western hemisphere and was turning to alternative sources of financing so that the Regional Centre in Lima, Peru, might be able to cope with the new tasks related to peace arising from the current dynamics in international relations in the post-cold-war period. Thus, the delegation of Peru would like to emphasize that machinery for confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, the maintenance and building of peace, the diversion of current military expenditures towards social development activities, arms limitation and the participation of regional agencies in disarmament, security and stability, zones of peace, nuclear-free zones and zones free of other weapons of mass destruction, consultative and cooperation arrangements and the role of the United Nations: these are among the current and important issues that the United Nations can publicize through the proposals contained in this draft resolution, thereby perhaps, providing new tools for revitalizing the work of the Regional Centres.

Mr. Afeto (Togo) *(interpretation from French)*: My delegation supports draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24, entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean", which has just been introduced by the Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations.

This draft, drawn up within the framework of agenda item 71 (c) concerning the review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly is also sponsored by South Africa on behalf of the members of the African Group of States and by numerous other States of Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia.

The United Nations Regional Centres in Africa and in Latin America, which were established in 1986 and 1987 respectively, have as their main purpose to supply States, on request, practical support for the initiatives they will undertake and for the efforts they will be making to promote peace, development, disarmament and arms limitation. In that context, the Centres have had to disseminate information on these issues for Governments, students, researchers and other individual and legal entities interested in the problems of disarmament and development. They have also organized seminars and conferences and carried out studies.

For its part, the Regional Centre for Africa based in Lomé, Togo, has, over the last few years, conducted a number of studies dealing with the causes of conflicts in Africa and border problems existing in the five African subregions.

In 1994, with the assistance of the United Nations Information Centre in Lomé, the Regional Centre for Africa organized, on the occasion of United Nations Day and Disarmament Week, an information day throughout the regions and districts of the country, with the cooperation of the Togo Federation of Associations and Clubs of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. It also lent its technical and administrative support to the standing Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and security in Central Africa and contributed to the study conducted by the Secretariat on the question of the proliferation of small arms in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion.

All information relating to the life and programme of activities of the Regional Centres is contained in the report of the Secretary-General — document A/50/380.

Consideration of this report reveals that the programme of activities of the three Regional Centres are rather far-ranging and in keeping with the mandate given to them by the General Assembly when they were established. It can be seen from this report, however, that the financial situation of these bodies is rather alarming, particularly that of the Centre for Africa and the Centre for Latin America

and the Caribbean. This has led the Secretary-General to envisage and advocate the extreme solution of closing the Centres if Member States fail to shoulder their responsibilities in finding appropriate solutions at this fiftieth session of the General Assembly to the problem of financing the Centres.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24, which include all the States of Africa, believe that peace and security are priceless and that they cannot therefore be assessed in financial terms.

They believe, moreover, that at a time when their respective States are facing the phenomenon of anarchical proliferation and the illegal traffic in small arms in their regions, the Centres have a dominant role to play in helping to put an end to this scourge. The Centre can also be used to contribute and play a decisive role in preventive diplomacy to assist in stopping any conflict, whether latent or open, to prevent it from becoming an open wound, which is then much more difficult to control.

It is along these lines that in paragraph 2 they have reaffirmed their strong support for further operation and strengthening of the two Regional Centres.

To cope with the problem of financing, an appeal is made, in paragraph 5, to Member States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make more substantial voluntary contributions to the special fund set put for that purpose in order to revitalize the two Centres, strengthen their programmes of activities and facilitate the effective implementation of these programmes. The Secretary-General is requested to explore new ways to find adequate financing for the activities of the two Centres.

To allow the Regional Centres to achieve more positive results in the future the sponsors believe that their directors should, in so far as possible, be locally based for greater effectiveness. This is all the more urgent and necessary because in the case of the Regional Centre for Africa, in particular, the Government of Togo is providing at no cost electricity and other expenses. It is also making available, at no cost to the United Nations, the premises housing the Centre, and a modern villa which serves as the residence for the Director and his family.

Taking all of these considerations into account, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24 urge Member States to pay increased attention to the problems of the Regional Centres by providing them with the material and financial means which they need to carry out effectively their mandate of advancing peace, security, disarmament and development in the regions concerned.

The question is an important one. The sponsors therefore hope that it will receive the full attention of all United Nations Member States so that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24 can be, as in past years, adopted without a vote.

The Acting Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I call on the representative of Pakistan to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.38.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Regional disarmament" contained in document A/C.1/50/L.38, on behalf of the following sponsors: Albania, Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Zambia and Zimbabwe and my own delegation.

Throughout history, the concerns and consequences of wars and conflicts have been largely local and regional in nature. The exceptions were the imperial wars of yesteryear and the historic confrontation between the two super-Powers during the cold war. In the post-cold-war era, once again major threats to international peace and security emanate from regional disputes and conflicts, which have proliferated in so many parts of the world. These conflicts are often the *raison d'être* of the regional race for the acquisition and accumulation of armaments. This in turn leads to the escalation in the scale of violence and suffering in ongoing conflicts. Furthermore, the imbalances created in such regional arms races accentuate the danger of aggression and the use of force, as also the search for non-conventional means of self-defence and deterrence.

The international community has now fully accepted the proposition that arms control and disarmament measures at the global level cannot effectively address the aspects of arms races emanating from regional dynamics. Global arms control and disarmament must be complemented by regional measures, and vice versa. Global and regional disarmament should be pursued simultaneously. Global measures are necessary to create conditions conducive to regional disarmament, while regional disarmament measures will be essential for the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/50/L.38 affirms these propositions regarding the importance of regional disarmament. It takes into account most of the guidelines for regional disarmament adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1993. It also underlines the fact that regional disarmament measures would enhance the security of small States and thus contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts.

In its operative part, the draft resolution also calls on States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels. The progress made towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in several parts of the world is a most encouraging sign of the potential of the regional approach to disarmament. The draft resolution therefore welcomes the initiatives that have been taken by some States for disarmament, non-proliferation and security at the regional and subregional levels, and supports the efforts for confidence-building measures.

My delegation hopes that the draft resolution will be adopted once again by an overwhelming majority.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Afghanistan, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.37.

Mr. Osman (Afghanistan): Allow me to introduce a significant draft resolution on measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms, document A/C.1/50/L.37.

I remind members of General Assembly resolution 49/75 M of last year, which recognized that the availability of massive quantities of conventional weapons and their illicit transfer were often associated with destabilizing activities and the violation of human rights. My delegation is of the conviction that the illicit availability of arms encourages certain groups to bypass peaceful means of resolving disputes and turn to violence.

We believe that peace and security are strongly linked with — and in some cases are imperative for — economic development and reconstruction in many States. Curbing illicit transfers and also the use of conventional arms is a most important step towards general and complete disarmament. When arms are illicitly transferred and stockpiled in a State, they will not remain confined within that State: the arms will diffuse out and fall into the hands of terrorists and mercenaries, who will create terror and destruction and pose a threat to the peace and stability of many States in the same region and even beyond.

I trust that all representatives are in agreement with me that we should fulfil our historic obligations towards the enduring legacy of the peace process, and the adoption of this draft resolution by consensus will bring us one step closer to this common goal.

My delegation has joined in sponsoring a number of draft resolutions in the field of general and complete disarmament and the maintenance of peace and security, and we especially support draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.9, according to which the General Assembly would declare the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan. I am sure that Turkmenistan will play an active and positive role in preserving peace and security internationally, in the region and beyond.

Mr. Ramaker (Netherlands): I wish to thank the Swedish delegation for submitting and once again this year introducing a draft resolution — this time draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.34 — on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects — commonly known as the Convention on certain conventional weapons.

The Netherlands is one of the sponsors of this draft resolution, and would like to take this opportunity to underline its value in contributing to the necessary restraint in the use of certain categories of conventional weapons, notably land-mines.

The havoc wrought by land-mines has gravely affected civilian populations in particular, not only during armed conflicts around the globe but also long after these conflicts have ended. Tightening the international rules on land-mines is part of concerted efforts by the international community to deal with the tragedies caused by these weapons.

Sweden has traditionally submitted this draft resolution, with the intention of creating a greater awareness of the importance of the Convention on certain conventional weapons and its Protocols and to increase adherence to them. These efforts are now bearing fruit, especially since France took the initiative two years ago of requesting the depositary, the United Nations Secretary-General, to convene a review conference with the main purpose of strengthening Protocol II to the Convention, on

land-mines. The preparatory process for the Review Conference — although there was no agreement on each and every detail of how to strengthen Protocol II — resulted, apparently, in good prospects for a conference that would be of great importance for helping resolve the world-wide problems caused by land-mines.

In the meantime, the increased political attention being paid to the Convention has caused the number of States parties to it to go from a modest 35 two years ago to 50 now, so it is not without good reason that according to the Swedish draft resolution the General Assembly would welcome these developments.

In view of the growing attention to the grave problems caused by land-mines and the increasing recognition by the international community of the relevance in this regard of the 1980 Convention and the importance of strengthening its Protocol II, it was with high hopes that the Netherlands delegation went to Vienna last September intending to make the Review Conference a success. Unfortunately, we left that city three weeks later in disappointment. Certainly, the agreement on a new Protocol on blinding laser weapons should be hailed as an important achievement, for not only does that Protocol ban the use of a future category of weapons, it further enhances the relevance of the conventional weapons Convention as an instrument of international humanitarian law, but nevertheless it was clear from the outset that world opinion would judge the Vienna Review Conference in the light of its contribution to stemming the ever-increasing, disastrous effects of the unrestrained use of land-mines. It was therefore regrettable indeed that, after all the preparatory work and after the intense efforts at the Conference itself, agreement on a meaningful strengthening of Protocol II was not within reach.

Disappointing as the three weeks in Vienna turned out to be, it was nevertheless a positive sign that at the end of the Conference the participating States themselves realized that work should continue. It was the general feeling that during the continued review process we should all do our utmost to conclude the negotiations on a substantially strengthened Protocol II. In this respect, the Netherlands delegation echoes the call made in the draft resolution for States parties to intensify their efforts to achieve that aim. In simply noting the fact that the Review Conference was not able to complete its work on Protocol II, the Swedish draft is expressing the wish shared by my delegation that we should be forward-looking, and work constructively together when the Conference resumes in January and continues in April-May next year.

More hard work is indeed needed to achieve positive results. We are hopeful that this will be possible. During the final days of the Vienna Conference a basic understanding was reached on what elements are of importance for technical requirements of land-mines, especially as far as detectability, self-destruction or self-neutralization and self-deactivating back-up is concerned. We should build on this in January 1996, when the Conference resumes its work because without meaningful agreement on technical requirements for land-mines, any prohibition of, or restriction on, the use thereof would risk being an empty shell.

There are other positive elements on which the resumed Review Conference should build. The consensus that the scope of Protocol II should be extended to include internal armed conflicts, and the fact that there is now general acceptance of the principle that an amended Protocol II should also incorporate restrictions on transfers of land-mines are an example of these elements.

We should all reflect on what could be an acceptable outcome of the Review Conference. In this respect, some States parties have referred to legitimate security concerns. We understand those concerns. However, the Netherlands delegation and the Netherlands believe that we should be guided on this issue by the generally accepted principle of the law of warfare — that there should be a proper balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns.

The Acting Chairman: (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Congo, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.20.

Mr. Bakala (Congo) (*interpretation from French*): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.20, entitled "Regional confidence-building measures", on behalf of the 11 States members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, namely Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad and Zaire.

Everyone is aware of the acts of violence, of the tensions, the conflicts and the atmosphere of insecurity that have dominated Central Africa over the past few years. The proliferation of weapons and the emergence of armed bands have been the major factors in the spawning of violence and insecurity in the subregion. The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, which held its seventh ministerial meeting

last August in Brazzaville, observing the geopolitical situation of the subregion, noted a clear improvement in that situation given the historic peace agreements signed between the Government of Angola and UNITA, as well as the peace efforts of the United Nations under way in Burundi and Rwanda, and also the restoration of peace in the Republic of the Congo.

However, improvement in no way means eradication of the underlying evil — the eradication of those threats that jeopardize the internal security of the Committee's members. Peace remains fragile in the subregion. It is because of this that this year the member States of the Committee are submitting a draft resolution which involves a slight change from resolution 49/76 C, adopted last year by the General Assembly.

In order for peace to be guaranteed, and in order to preserve peace where it has been threatened, the members of the Committee have decided to use special units in peace-keeping operations. But, clearly, this task can be completed successfully only if the special units of the subregion receive adequate training. It is for that purpose that the Secretary-General is requested in the draft resolution to facilitate the organization of a training seminar for the establishment of special units in peace-keeping operations. Inasmuch as we have met here to discuss questions of peace and international security, let us not forget that peace in Central Africa is still fragile. When we deal with this draft resolution, let us give thought to that fact so as to prevent the subregion from sinking once again into violence and deadly conflict.

The Acting Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I call on the representative of Colombia, who on behalf of the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, will introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/50/L.25, A/C.1/50/L.26 and A/C.1/50/L.44 and draft decision A/C.1/50/L.30.

Mr. García (Colombia) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: On behalf of the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, I have the pleasure to introduce three draft resolutions.

The first draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/50/L.26, refers to the relationship between disarmament and development, under item 70 (h) of our agenda. This issue was discussed at the recent summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cartagena, Colombia. They reiterated their concern about the fact that the arms race in the contemporary world was absorbing a large proportion of human, financial, material and technological resources, and was placing heavy burdens on the economies of all countries, in particular those of developing countries. It had an impact on international financial and trade flows. There was a dramatic contrast between military expenditures in the world and the impact of underdevelopment, with its aftermath of poverty and misery afflicting more than two thirds of humanity.

It is of the utmost urgency that the international community should allocate to economic and social development a share of the resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament agreements, in order to reduce the tremendous gap between developed and developing countries. This is the gist of the draft resolution we have the honour to submit.

The second draft resolution which we are submitting on behalf of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries concerns the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament — item 70 (g) of the agenda. It is contained in document A/C.1/50/L.25. As is known, during the decade 1978 to 1988 there were three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The changes in the international arena clearly justify speedy consideration of the most important issues relating to the disarmament process, and to mobilizing the international community and public opinion in support of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the control and reduction of conventional weapons.

In view of the fact that at the end of 1996 negotiations on important disarmament issues will have been concluded, and important agreements will have been adopted, the year 1997 would be the appropriate time to review the progress made in the area of disarmament in the post-war period. This draft resolution also calls for the establishment of a preparatory committee to prepare recommendations on this item in the course of the next session of the General Assembly.

The third draft resolution that we are submitting on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries refers to bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament. This draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/50/L.44, retains the basic points of resolution 49/75 L submitted by our Movement last year — a resolution adopted without a vote. In the draft we are submitting now there are some changes. It also covers the most recent

developments in this connection, as well as some proposals adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, contained in the Final Declaration of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995.

We are also submitting a draft decision under item 60 of the agenda. That decision set forth in document A/C.1/50/L.30, calls for the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly of the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security".

Finally, I should like to say that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has also submitted a draft resolution on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. That draft will be introduced by the Ambassador of Sri Lanka.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Japan, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.7.

Ms. Kurokochi (Japan): I should like, on behalf of the 17 sponsors, to introduce a draft resolution on small arms. In operative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/50/L.7, the Secretary-General is requested, with the assistance of a panel group of governmental experts to be nominated by him, to prepare a report on, *inter alia*, the ways and means to prevent and reduce excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflicts.

In preparing this draft resolution, my delegation has had informal consultations with many other delegations interested in this subject. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those that made useful comments, which helped us a great deal in improving upon our original text. It is the hope of my delegation that this draft resolution will attract widespread support at the time of action on it.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Algeria, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.36.

Mr. Mesdoua (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation has asked to speak to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.36, entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region". The Algerian delegation is honoured today to introduce this draft resolution on behalf of the following countries: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Morocco, the Netherlands, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia and the United Kingdom.

This year again the group of traditional sponsors, which has subsequently been enlarged with the sponsorship of the other countries of the European Union, reflects support for the shared will of the States of the Mediterranean basin to make our region a zone of peace, security and cooperation, thereby giving to the Mediterranean its mission of "a lake of peace".

Assisted by the atmosphere of *détente* on the global level, the Mediterranean countries, over the last few years, have stepped up their shared efforts to consolidate peace and security in the region, and to lay down the basis for multiform cooperation, which is indispensable for the prosperity and stability of the countries of the Mediterranean area.

In addition, all the members of the European Union have associated themselves this year with the coastal countries of the Mediterranean, to reflect their readiness to participate in strengthening the prospects for ever closer Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

The draft resolution which the sponsors are submitting to our Committee does not differ basically from the resolutions adopted at previous sessions. In fact, the multidimensional approach to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area continues to predominate in the concerted action of the countries of the region. To make the Mediterranean a shared area of security and cooperation, the draft resolution reiterates the fundamental principles contained in operative paragraphs 1 and 2, and recalls the need to eliminate the economic and social disparities among the countries of the Mediterranean basin.

The Mediterranean countries, in fact, consider full respect for these principles as indispensable for the strengthening of inter-Mediterranean relations. It is moreover in that context that the countries of the two shores have undertaken numerous concerted efforts to convene a Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference which will take place in Barcelona on 27 and 28 November.

In that context, I wish to mention in particular the Ministerial Meeting of the Mediterranean Forum, held at Tabarka, in Tunisia, on 28 and 29 July last, which was devoted to preparations for the Barcelona Conference. That is why this draft resolution encourages precisely the kinds of efforts that are being made by the Mediterranean countries jointly to define their future relations in order to meet common challenges through appropriate means, in a spirit of partnership aimed at turning the Mediterranean Basin into an area of dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity for all.

The sponsors of the draft resolution hope that the forthcoming Barcelona Conference will contribute to freeing Euro-Mediterranean relations from mistaken perceptions, to deepening political, economic and cultural cooperation, and to promoting Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Barcelona should thus provide a valuable opportunity to lay down the priority guidelines for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and to launch a cultural dialogue as a factor in the *rapprochement* of the peoples of the region.

As concerns disarmament, the States of the region are urged, while taking into account the specific nature of the Mediterranean Basin, to base themselves on the results of the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to adhere to all legal instruments on disarmament as an important step in advancing the security of all the coastal States of the Mediterranean. In addition, the States of the region are urged to favour the necessary conditions for strengthening confidence-building measures among them, in particular by promoting transparency in the area of weapons and by participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as well as in the system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures.

Moreover, through this draft resolution, the sponsors also wish to reaffirm their will to mobilize with regard to the problems facing the countries of the Mediterranean region, in order to combat terrorism, crime and drug trafficking and to halt the illicit transfer of weapons. The sponsors also reiterate their determination to combat all phenomena that hinder the advancement of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the establishment of the foundations of democracy and a pluralist society.

The sponsors mentioned earlier are confident that Committee members will, as was the case at previous sessions, unanimously support draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.36 by adopting it without a vote.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cuba, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.41.

Mr. Rivero (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to introduce to the First Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.41, entitled "Adherence to environmental standards in the elaboration and implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements". This draft is introduced under agenda item 70, "General and complete disarmament".

The draft resolution submitted initially by the delegation of Cuba refers to a matter that is rarely addressed in our Committee but one to which all countries are paying increasing attention in the elaboration and implementation of disarmament agreements, namely the question of protection of the environment. As the draft indicates, on the one hand an appeal is made to the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum — the Conference on Disarmament — to take into account the importance of protection of the environment when preparing agreements on disarmament or the limitation of weapons, and, to this end, to take all steps necessary to ensure the inclusion of standards to this effect in such disarmament agreements. It also emphasizes that, in implementing, in all its aspects, the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, account should be taken of environmental protection standards.

Further, as concerns the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons and the work of the ad hoc group that is to consider a possible verification mechanism for the Convention, such norms should, to the extent possible, also be taken into account.

The draft also contains a reference to the positive implications that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have for the environment. In this connection, an appeal is addressed to the Conference on Disarmament to conclude that treaty as a matter of the highest priority — at the very latest by next year, 1996.

The draft also mentions the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. We would express the wish of the General Assembly to prohibit the use of such techniques. The draft appeals to those States that are not yet parties to that Convention to accede to it with a view to ensuring its universality.

As can be noted, an attempt is made in the draft resolution to include existing concerns relative to environmental protection within the context of disarmament agreements: we are not referring to the environment *per se*. We hope that the draft will receive the firm support of members of the Committee and will be adopted without a vote.

In view of the consultations under way, a revised text and an up-to-date list of sponsors will be submitted later.

The Acting Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Egypt, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.19.

Mr. Karem (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I am pleased, at the outset, to congratulate Mr. Erdenechuluun on his election to the Chair of this Committee. I am also personally pleased to congratulate my brother and friend, the representative of Jordan, on his appointment as Rapporteur of the First Committee. Let me also express our appreciation for the efforts of the First Committee's Secretary, Mr. Kheradi.

This statement was to be delivered by the Permanent Representative of Egypt, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for November, but circumstances dictated otherwise. Allow me to deliver this statement in his stead.

My delegation is pleased today to introduce, in its capacity as Chairman of the Group of States members of the League of Arab States for the month of November, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.19, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

For decades now the Middle East has been the scene of conflict and the theatre of devastating wars which posed a continuing grave threat to international peace and security. With the progress achieved by the peace process and the budding forth of its fruits, the latest of which was the second interim agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which was signed in September 1995, the need is more pressing than ever to safeguard the region from the grave consequences of the existence in it of nuclear weapons and of the attendant perils of a nuclear arms race. There is no doubt that the total elimination of these threats would contribute to consolidating peace and to accelerating its momentum at this sensitive juncture in the region's history. This desired aim cannot be achieved unless all States in the region undertake equal, balanced and reciprocal obligations and enjoy equal rights. The keyword here is equality, and I repeat: equality, across the board.

The realization of universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty remains the genuine and effective means of eliminating the threat of nuclear proliferation. The draft resolution now before us in document A/C.1/50/L.19 aims at achieving this universality at the regional level in a balanced manner, by calling on all States not yet party to the non-proliferation Treaty to accede to the Treaty and to fully place all their nuclear facilities, on an equal footing, under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

At the same time, the draft resolution addresses the nuclear capabilities of the States not yet party to the Treaty in a realistic fashion by reflecting a clear factual distinction that has to be recognized and redressed. There is only one State in the region, namely Israel, that is not party yet to the Treaty while it possesses advanced unsafeguarded nuclear capabilities, whereas the other States which are not yet party to the Treaty have no nuclear programmes whatsoever, let alone any advanced unsafeguarded nuclear capabilities.

The sponsors of the draft resolution have legitimate expectations. They expect the international community to apply one single standard where the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is concerned and not to allow the use of any double standards. They expect complete unequivocal support for this draft resolution and, thereby, for the NPT itself. The issue at stake here is not a regional political dispute but rather the very credibility of the global non-proliferation regime. It is totally unwarranted and discriminatory to shelter any non-party to the Treaty from the need to acquiesce in the general and solid resolve of the international community to ensure universal adherence to the Treaty. Any exception will only cast grave doubts on the credibility of the results of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and on the sincerity and intentions of the States parties to the NPT *vis-à-vis* the Middle East region especially when the Conference has found it necessary to adopt a separate resolution on the Middle East wherein it voiced very clearly the concern felt by the international community *vis-à-vis* the present situation I have just outlined.

The stark reality is that the postures of all the States parties to the NPT must be consistent. Striving for the realization of universal adherence to the Treaty is a legal obligation as well as a moral principle. It is also a fact that

many States parties to the NPT hesitate to support the principle of universality because the only State in the Middle East with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities is named in the draft resolution. To those parties I affirm that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.19 calls upon all the States in the Middle East, and I repeat: all the States of the Middle East, in a precise, balanced and objective fashion, to accede to the Treaty. This call constitutes an invitation to one of the most advanced countries in the nuclear field to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty on equal terms with all the other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT whose number now exceeds 180 States.

Quite frankly, there is no selectiveness or singling out in the draft resolution. It is those who hesitate to support it that are being selective towards the Middle East by sending a clear message that says quite clearly that as far as the Middle East is concerned, nuclear proliferation is permissible and double standards do indeed apply.

The sponsors of the draft resolution sincerely hope that at this fiftieth-anniversary session the guiding principle will be the attainment of the lofty goals enunciated by Heads of State or Government in their solemn collective Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, and the translation of those goals into concrete reality by sparing the Middle East the horrific threat of nuclear destruction.

Mrs. Samate (Burkina Faso) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation joins others in supporting draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29, entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them", which was introduced yesterday by the representative of the Republic of Mali on behalf of the other sponsors, including Burkina Faso.

For the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion, small arms constitute a threat to peace and security. They not only impede disarmament but also increase insecurity. Hence, it is important to encourage the initiatives and activities mutually agreed upon by the States of our subregion to put an end to the scourge of the traffic in small arms. Such subregional action can be effective only with the support of the international community, and my delegation appeals to all States to support the efforts of our countries to halt trafficking in these arms, and to help in curbing this traffic and in collecting the weapons.

We hope that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29 will enjoy broad support in the First Committee and in the General Assembly.

Mr. Yativ (Israel): I wish to comment on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.19 that has just been introduced. The draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" is, regrettably, once again on the agenda of the First Committee. Although its removal from the agenda on account of its singling out of Israel has been long overdue, the present text represents further escalation both in letter and spirit.

The draft resolution, as submitted, continues to single out Israel, is out of tune with the Middle East process and serves no other purpose than to discomfit Israel. The singling out of Israel and the phenomenon of name-calling in this draft resolution have not only been maintained but an additional operative paragraph, paragraph 2, has been inserted, singling out Israel, though indirectly and not by name.

Furthermore, the new fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs contain elements which go counter to the basic concept of Israel's policy which underlines the regional approach, direct negotiations encompassing all States of the region, and mutual verification arrangements. Israel's declared support of the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does not detract from the fact that Israel is not party to that convention and is not bound by the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The entire draft resolution, with its additional paragraphs, does not change the oft-repeated valid argument that, substantively, this draft resolution is devoid of any message that is not included in other resolutions. Thus, its politically motivated purpose is exposed and befits the anachronistic past of the Arab-Israeli confrontation and not the spirit of reconciliation that prevails today in the region.

Israel has gone an extra mile to placate Arab concerns by generating remarkable progress in the peace process. It should be recalled that Israel is the one to take high risks in the peace process and its continued arraignment in United Nations resolutions will be counter-productive to peacemaking efforts. At the same time, Israel does not believe that the nuclear issue should be lifted from the context of peacemaking efforts either in priority or in timing.

No extraregional prescription or imposition of any kind will be conducive to the enhancement of peace in the region. The progress in the peace process, thus far, by

direct negotiations, amply and remarkably proves this notion. The tone and content of this draft resolution can only serve to undermine the peace process.

Israel will continue to oppose this draft resolution on account both of its name-calling and of its overall adverse effect on the peace process. These two principles should not be ignored any longer, otherwise the delicate balance on this matter might be upset. Therefore, we call upon all those who abstained or supported this obsolete resolution to vote against it and, thus, to stretch out their hand to the ongoing efforts for peace and reconciliation in the Middle East.

Mr. Mpay (Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): As my delegation is taking the floor for the first time in this Committee I would like to extend our congratulations to the Chairman on his election and on the way in which he has been guiding our work. I also wish to congratulate the other members of the Bureau.

The delegation of Cameroon wishes to express its support for draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.20, entitled "Regional confidence-building measures".

To understand the grounds for that draft resolution and its scope, we must, on the one hand, consider the fact that the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa was established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to promote peace, security and development in the subregion. On the other hand, we must consider the fact that the subregion to which the 11 States members of the Standing Advisory Committee belong is a region that has experienced, and continues to experience, crises and conflicts which could destabilize the entire subregion. I shall merely recall here the situations in Angola, Rwanda and Burundi, which have led to the vast mobilization of both the material and the financial resources of the entire international community in an effort to find a solution. The subregion to which the 11 States members of the Committee belong thus deserves the special attention of our Committee.

The draft resolution — A/C.1/50/L.20 — differs little from the resolutions adopted by our Committee at earlier sessions. It does however introduce a new element, which is fully justified in terms of preventive diplomacy. On the basis of the lessons learned from the difficulties which the Secretary-General of the United Nations ran into in deploying peace-keeping forces, in particular in Rwanda, the members of the Committee decided to set up peace-keeping units within their respective armed forces. Those units will be available to, and can be deployed at a moment's notice by, the Secretary-General of the United Nations for any peace-keeping mission either in the subregion or elsewhere in the world.

The 11 countries of the subregion are proposing the setting up of what in fact amounts to a reserve force of almost 10,000 soldiers for peace. The countries members of the Committee with neither the theoretical knowledge nor the practical experience to organize such peace-keeping operations have no choice but to appeal to our Organization, which will need to have the reserve force available so that the units can be trained and prepared in order to be effective.

The permanent availability of this force in our subregion will make it possible to ward off many conflicts, in particular since the countries of the Committee plan to make this an instrument for advancing security in the subregion. It is a outstanding instrument of preventive diplomacy, which we should all encourage. Had this instrument existed in the subregion before, the crises and conflicts which the region has experienced might not have occurred on such a scale, which would have spared the international community from mobilizing such vast resources to resolve them. We are, therefore, convinced that prevention is better than cure, which is the rationale behind all the confidence-building measures that have been adopted by the Standing Advisory Committee so far. We urge the members of our Committee to adopt the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.20 by consensus.

The Acting President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of South Africa, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.21.

Ms. Mxakato-Diseko (South Africa): It is a singular honour for me to present to the First Committee of the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly the draft resolution on the "Expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament" contained in document A/C.1/50/L.21.

The urgent need to expand the membership of the Conference on Disarmament was recognized by the United Nations General Assembly during its forty-ninth session when it adopted resolution 49/77 B without a vote. This resolution played a significant role in the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt the report of Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, the Special Coordinator for Membership during the 1993 session of the Conference, in

which he recommended an expansion of the membership of the Conference to include Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

Ambassador O'Sullivan's report further argued for a dynamic solution to the question of membership. My delegation also wishes here to again pay a special tribute to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Benjelloun Toumi of Morocco. His skill and determination helped bring about the decision of the Conference set forth in document CD/1360 of 22 September 1995.

According to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.21, which we have submitted for the consideration of the First Committee, the General Assembly would recall the report of 12 August 1993 of the Special Coordinator for Membership designated by the Conference on Disarmament and the subsequent statement made by the Special Coordinator on 26 August 1993, recommending a dynamic solution to the question of membership, It would recognize the legitimate aspirations of all countries that have applied for membership to participate fully in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It would acknowledge decision CD/1356 taken at the 719th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 21 September 1995, including the commitment to implement the decision at the earliest possible date. It would call for the implementation of decision CD/1356, on the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament on an urgent basis. It would strongly urge that the new members should, in pursuance of decision CD/1356 and, with particular reference to the provisions contained in paragraph 2 of that decision, all assume together membership of the Conference at the start of the 1996 session of the Conference and would also call on the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with its decision CD/1356, to review the situation following the presentation of progress reports by the President of the Conference on ongoing consultations at the end of each part of its annual session.

The drafters of the resolution on the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament have also today agreed to include a further paragraph stipulating that the General Assembly:

> "Urges that, following the presentation of progress reports by the President of the Conference, the other candidatures to date be further considered by the Conference at its 1996 session."

Consultations with the members of the Conference on Disarmament and other interested delegations are continuing. We are hopeful that there is an emerging consensus on the text of this draft resolution, which will make it possible for it to be adopted without a vote, as was the case with last year's resolution on this topic.

The Chairman returned to the Chair.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Mexico to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.5.

Miss Rovirosa (Mexico) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: As is traditional, my delegation has the honour to introduce to the Committee on behalf of its 28 sponsors, draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.5, under agenda item 77, entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

Every year a growing number of States in the region join in sponsoring this text. Every year, also, the General Assembly adopts it without a vote. These facts attest to the importance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, not only for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, but also for all nations that love peace. They give due importance to Latin America's efforts to consolidate the first densely populated area to be entirely free of nuclear weapons. With the adherence of Saint Lucia and the ratification by Saint Kitts and Nevis as well as the adherence of the Government of Cuba in the course of this year, the Treaty has now come into effect for 30 of the 36 States in our region.

The conclusion of the pioneer enterprise is approaching its goal. The consolidation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has also provided an example and encouragement for the preparation of other treaties establishing nuclear-free zones, such as the Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific, the forthcoming conclusion of the Treaty of Pelindaba on the African continent, and negotiations relating to South-East Asia. When these treaties have fully come into effect the broad area of the southern hemisphere of the Earth will be free of the nuclear threat.

The preamble of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.5 reflects the most recent events, such as the adherence to and ratification of the Treaty by Saint Lucia and by Saint Kitts and Nevis and its signature by Cuba. It also notes that the

amended Treaty is now fully in force for eight States in the region, including my own.

In the operative paragraphs the General Assembly would welcome the concrete steps taken by several countries of the region during the past year for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty. It would note with satisfaction the full adherence of Saint Lucia to the Treaty and would urge the countries of the region that have not yet done so to deposit their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty approved by the General Conference of the Agency on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean — OPANAL — in 1990, 1991 and 1992.

The draft resolution reflects the will and determination of the Latin American and Caribbean region to promote peace and to eliminate nuclear weapons. The prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance and should be supported without reservation by the international community and the First Committee. We hope that, as in previous years, the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of India to introduce draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/50/L.47 and A/C.1/50/L.48.

Ms. Ghose (India): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.47, which is sponsored by 27 countries, namely, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, the Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines, the Sudan, Viet Nam and my own delegation.

In introducing this draft resolution, I should like briefly to recapitulate the context in which this draft resolution is being put forward.

While the draft resolution itself is similar to ones which have been adopted by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly in the past, today's context is somewhat different, as has been articulated by almost all speakers, not least the sponsors, in the general debate in this Committee and in the plenary Assembly.

It is our view that the time is now appropriate to address squarely the issue of the possession of nuclear weapons by a few countries, and the potential threat that the existence of such weapons continues to pose to international peace and security. Since May this year, we have noted a remarkable reluctance on the part of some of the nuclear-weapon States even to address the issue of nuclear disarmament in a multilateral framework.

Some tentative steps are indeed being taken to maintain the status quo at least, to halt nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, through, for example, the comprehensive test-ban treaty, but these steps will be rendered meaningless unless the issue of nuclear disarmament is taken up at the same time. Recognizing that the process — should it ever begin — will be a long one, we feel that it is necessary to freeze the use of these weapons, and the threat of their use. This would not only provide a kind of security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States, as validly demanded by them, but would also introduce a degree of confidence in the seriousness of ongoing disarmament negotiations and add an impetus for their successful conclusion.

Such a convention as is envisaged in the draft resolution would, in our view, be a legitimate and practical step towards the goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. Clearly, the adoption of such a resolution would send as clear a signal as possible to those nuclear-weapon States that still believe in the validity of the doctrine of deterrence.

Is it conceivable that the world would sit by and accept the use or threat of use of these terrible weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State? Is it conceivable that international peace and security would be served if the nuclear-weapon States continue to maintain the right to use or threaten to use such weapons against each other? These are not just questions relating to national security; these are questions about the shape of the future world.

It is in this context that this draft resolution has been sponsored and submitted in this Committee. The draft resolution underlines that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind. In this text the General Assembly would welcome the recent nuclear disarmament measures initiated by the United States and the Russian Federation; note that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would strengthen international security and help promote a climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate

elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

The sixth preambular paragraph clearly stresses that such a convention would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

In operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly would reiterate the request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, on a priority basis, to reach an agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a possible basis the annexed draft convention.

Given the seriousness of the situation today, we look forward to the widest possible support from the Committee for the draft resolution.

I also have the honour to introduce the second draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/50/L.48, on behalf of the delegations of Bhutan, Guyana, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and my own delegation, India.

We have tried in this draft resolution to deal with three interlocking and crucial issues in the context of the role of science and technology in international security and disarmament issues.

First, we have flagged the importance of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the arms build-up as promoted by science and technology, that is, the negative impacts of science and technology. The action of States parties to the Convention on conventional weapons to ban the use and transfer of blinding weapons while those weapons were still at the prototype stage is a case in point.

Secondly, in this draft resolution the General Assembly would recognize that scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged. It would also take into account the fact that international transfers of high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes are important for the economic and social development of States.

The third point that is addressed by the draft resolution is referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph, which recalls the Final Declaration of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cartagena recently. In the Final Declaration, the Heads of State or Government noted that restrictions placed on access to technology through non-transparent, ad hoc export control regimes with exclusive membership tended to impede the economic and social development of developing countries by denying them access to technological developments. Therefore, in operative paragraph 3 Member States are urged to undertake multilateral negotiations with participation by all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable and non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of high technology with military applications.

In the draft resolution a call is also made for the promotion of the exchange of technological know-how for peaceful purposes, and the Secretary-General is requested to develop a database of concerned research institutions and experts with a view to promoting transparency and international cooperation in the applications of scientific and technological developments for pursuing disarmament objectives such as the disposal of weapons, conversion and so on.

It will be noted that this particular draft resolution is an update of a similar draft resolution submitted last year; in fact, we have tried to move towards having a single resolution on this very important subject, and we deeply regret that it was not possible for us to have such a single draft resolution this year. The main objection remains the arbitrary, ad hoc export-control regimes, which tend to limit, in a discriminatory way, access to technologies for peaceful purposes.

We are sure that a large number of countries share our point of view. We commend this draft resolution to the Committee, and hope that it will obtain widespread support.

I should now like to comment very briefly on some of the draft resolutions that have been introduced in this Committee on behalf of India and which India would have liked to join in sponsoring but was unable to.

Turning to the draft resolution on chemical weapons (A/C.1/50/L.14), which was introduced yesterday: we would have liked to be a sponsor. We were amongst the first signatories — and as we mentioned in the general debate, we are in the process of depositing the instrument of ratification — of this agreement. We therefore felt that the time was right for us to call on those that have not ratified to do so; however, we are aware that, at The Hague, the situation is not as we feel it should be.

Agreements that have already been made — the text of the agreement itself — appear to be unravelling. We would have encouraged the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to continue in its efforts to carry out its given mandate rather than welcome the ongoing efforts.

On this issue, the particular agreement that had been reached was that the text of article 11 of the chemical weapons Convention had been adopted on the understanding that the ad hoc export regime relating to this area — the so-called Australia Group — would cease to exist once we accepted this agreement. We do not see any signs of this, and what I said about ad hoc export regimes in introducing our second draft resolution just now certainly applies in this case.

The second draft resolution of which we would very much have liked to be a co-sponsor gives us the same problem. This is the draft resolution on a moratorium on the export of land-mines (A/C.1/50/L.45). We were a sponsor of this very resolution last year. We were active participants in Vienna in the drafting of Protocol II. We were very keen to be a sponsor of the draft resolution again this year. However, this draft resolution has moved towards the inclusion of some substantive areas. For example, the fifteenth preambular paragraph includes a reference to an ad hoc regime, indirect though it is, and this has precluded our supporting this particular draft resolution.

We have another problem that we have mentioned to the sponsors on the implementation of this agreement, which is still under negotiation. Since, unfortunately, the sponsors were unable to take our concerns on board, we will have to satisfy ourselves with merely supporting this draft resolution when it comes up for action.

There is also a draft resolution on small arms that was introduced today by the delegation of Japan — draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.7. Again, we would have liked to join in sponsoring this particular draft resolution. However, we feel that the mandate, as contained in that draft resolution, for the proposed panel to be set up by the Secretary-General, is too broad and too vague and might lead to difficulties in actual implementation. Had a tighter mandate been possible in the draft resolution, we would have had no hesitation in being a co-sponsor.

There were two other very important draft resolutions of which India has been a co-sponsor in the past: those on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and on a cut-off of fissile material. For both of these draft resolutions, given the new context to which I referred at the beginning of my intervention this afternoon, we had suggested to the sponsors preambular paragraphs that would locate both these treaties — the treaty under negotiation and the proposed treaty — in the context of the elimination of nuclear weapons within a phased programme and a time-bound framework. However, as I mentioned in my statement introducing the draft resolution on the convention on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, there is a reluctance on the part of nuclear-weapon States and others who fear their vote to include, even in the preambular paragraphs, references to what we believe is an essential part of both these treaties.

But, just in case it is felt that our commitment to the goals of these two treaties is in any way diluted, I should like to take this opportunity to assure the sponsors that this is not so. We regret not being able to join them as a sponsor of these draft resolutions but we will be participating in the negotiations as and when they take place.

I should like to make a brief comment on the draft resolution introduced by the representative of the Netherlands on transparency in armaments (A/C.1/50/L.18). This is an important draft resolution and we have supported it in the past and actively participated in all the group meetings. We have also been sending information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms on a regular basis.

However, following General Assembly resolution 48/75 E adopted in 1993, a second panel of governmental experts was established in 1994 to assist the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and to consider its further development. We participated in this expert group and our understanding was that the view to which the expert group came — that, for the moment, the issues of the addition of new categories and the expansion of the scope of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production — should be kept pending. It is our feeling that it is much more important at the moment to strengthen the norm of transparency and ensure greater participation in the Register than to engage in an expansion of the scope. The Register is not, in our view, an end in itself, but part of a wider international effort to promote openness and transparency in military matters, which would, we hope, contribute towards confidence-building and security among States.

There are two other draft resolutions which we feel are extremely important and which we will be supporting

when action is taken on them. These draft resolutions relate to verification and to compliance. The Group of Governmental Experts on Verification included an Indian expert and we are well aware of the very hard work that went into the preparation of the report. We feel that the draft resolution is right in calling the attention of Member States to this report. It is important that Member States give their views on how to refine the verification procedures.

However, we have not been able to join as a co-sponsor because the issue of verification has been taking on different connotations, depending on the area in which they are being considered. As is well known, we are negotiating very intensely the verification regime for the comprehensive test-ban treaty. We do not believe that a single verification regime applies across the board. What is applicable to chemical weapons need not necessarily be applicable to biological weapons or, indeed, to nuclear testing. It was with this wider thinking in view that we felt that we should like to support the draft resolution without necessarily being a co-sponsor at this stage.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of South Africa, who will introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/50/L.23 and A/C.1/50/L.22.

Ms. Mxakato-Diseko (South Africa): It is a singular honour for me to introduce on behalf of the African Group the draft resolutions on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone (A/C.1/50/L.23) and on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes (A/C.1/50/L.22).

It has been over 30 years since the idea of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone was first conceived, and what we are seeing this year is the culmination of years of negotiation and hard work.

For many years, a major obstacle was in fact my own country's non-accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This problem was overcome when South Africa not only acceded to the NPT, but also voluntarily and unilaterally stepped back from the nuclear-weapon threshold and dismantled its nuclear-weapons programme. This unique event gave the idea of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone fresh impetus and earlier this year a draft text for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty was drawn up. This text was approved by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers and confirmed by the Heads of State of the OAU at their meeting in Addis Ababa in June this year.

We now wish to present the text of the Pelindaba Treaty to the General Assembly and invite the members of the First Committee to support the draft resolution on this topic. The strength of the Treaty will lie in the support which it obtains from countries of Africa, the international community and the nuclear-weapon States in particular. In this regard, it is particularly important that the nuclear-weapon States should sign the relevant Protocols to the Treaty as soon as they become available.

Under the draft resolution the General Assembly would invite the African States to sign and ratify the Pelindaba Treaty as soon as possible. It would call upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; and would also call upon the States contemplated in Protocol III of the Pelindaba Treaty to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they were, *de jure* or de facto, internationally responsible, and which lay within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty; and would further call upon the nuclear-weapon States to bring the necessary support to the Pelindaba Treaty by signing the Protocols that concerned them as soon as the Treaty became available for signature.

Furthermore, the General Assembly would express its profound gratitude to the Secretary-General for the diligence with which he had rendered effective technical advice and financial assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the six meetings of the Group of Experts, set up jointly by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. It would request the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to extend to the African States in 1996 such facilities and assistance as might be requested, in order to achieve the aims of the resolution. It decided to include in the provisional agenda of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly an item entitled "African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty".

Through you, Sir, the members of the African Group appeal to all the members of the First Committee to support the draft resolution on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone and, as was the case last year, to adopt it without a vote.

I come now to the draft resolution on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive waste (A/C.1/50/L.22). This is a subject of great concern to the members of the African Group and one that is also taken up in the Pelindaba Treaty. In the operative part of the draft resolution the General Assembly would take note of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to a future convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons. It

would express grave concern regarding any use of nuclear wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States. It would call upon all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe the sovereignty of States. It would request the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, radioactive wastes as part of the scope of such a convention. It would also request the Conference on Disarmament to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of such a convention and to include in its report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session the progress recorded in the negotiations on the subject.

The Assembly would take note of resolution CM/Res.1356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa. That resolution expresses the hope that the effective implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste will enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories. It requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue keeping the subject under active review, including the desirability of concluding a legally binding instrument in this field.

By draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.22 the Assembly would decide to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes".

Through you, Sir, the members of the African Group appeal to all the members of the First Committee to support the draft resolution on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes and, as was the case last year, to adopt it without a vote.

The Chairman: I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform the Committee that the following countries have become co-sponsors of the following draft resolutions:

A/C.1/50/L.1/Rev.1: Croatia, Iceland, Indonesia and Lithuania;

A/C.1/50/L.3: Kyrgyzstan and Venezuela;

A/C.1/50/L.5: Bahamas;

A/C.1/50/L.8: Lithuania;

A/C.1/50/L.11: China;

A/C.1/50/L.15: Bangladesh, Iceland and Lithuania;

A/C.1/50/L.16: Singapore;

A/C.1/50/L.21: Bangladesh;

A/C.1/50/L.28: Indonesia;

A/C.1/50/L.33: Bangladesh;

A/C.1/50/L.34: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

A/C.1/50/L.37: Georgia;

A/C.1/50/L.39: Indonesia, Kenya and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

A/C.1/50/L.42: Georgia;

A/C.1/50/L.45: Bahamas and Ecuador;

A/C.1/50/L.46: Kenya;

A/C.1/50/L.48: Kenya and Guyana;

A/C.1/50/L.36: United Kingdom;

A/C.1/50/L.12: Kenya;

A/C.1/50/L.32: Kenya;

A/C.1/50/L.14: Croatia; and

A/C.1/50/L.23: Marshall Islands.

Programme of work

The Chairman: I should like to inform representatives that the officers of the Committee, with the assistance of the Secretariat, are in the process of preparing and finalizing a paper clustering all draft resolutions submitted to the Committee under various disarmament and international security agenda items. It is their intention to

finalize the paper after concluding the necessary consultations at their meeting, which is scheduled to take place today immediately after this morning's meeting of the First Committee, in order to be able to present the paper to the Committee tomorrow.

I should like to inform the Committee that, although a large number of draft resolutions have already been formally introduced in the Committee, a few others remain to be introduced. In view of these developments, I should like to suggest that the Committee begin action on draft resolutions on Friday, 10 November, instead of tomorrow as initially scheduled, in order to enable the sponsors of the remaining draft resolutions to introduce their texts, if they wish to do so, on Thursday, 9 November, and to allow as well for comments or statements to be presented on any of the draft resolutions.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with this suggestion.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.